A Theory of Interpretation of the European Convention on Human Rights

1. Human Rights, Legality, and the ECHR Introduction Background to and a Very Brief History of Human Rights No One-Size-Fits-All Theory of Human Rights Human Rights as Conditions of Legitimacy Human Rights, Legal Rights, and Interpretivism Conclusion 2. Autonomous Concepts, Conventionalism, and Judicial Discretion Introduction The Emergence of Autonomous Concepts Good-Faith Violations of the ECHR A More Recent Example of an Autonomous Concept Autonomous Concepts and Judicial Discretion Need for Harmonization and Uniform Application? Autonomous Concepts as Disagreement Does Disagreement Entail Judicial Discretion? Possible Choices 3. Intentionalism, Textualism, and Evolutive Interpretation Introduction Originalism in Constitutional Law Golder v UK: VCLT and the Case of Unenumerated Rights After Golder: the ECHR as a Living Instrument The Failures of Originalism The Object and Purpose of the ECHR Evolutive Interpretation: Truth Not Current Consensus 4. Two Concepts of the Margin of Appreciation Introduction Theories of International Human Rights Law The Substantive Concept of the Margin of Appreciation The Structural Concept of the Margin of Appreciation Consensus and Public Morals 5. Liberal Principles of Human Rights Interpretation Introduction Rights, Interests, and Reasons Liberal Egalitarian Theories of Rights: Rawls and Dworkin Rawls's Theory of Rights Dworkin's Rights as Trumps Liberal Egalitarian Principles for the Interpretation of the Limitation Clauses 6. Public Morals, Consensus, and Rights Inflation: A Critque Introduction Public Morals and the Moralistic Preferences of the Majority Consensus, Piecemeal Evolution, and Legality Rights Inflation: Hatton and the Right to Sleep Well