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AbstractEpistemic oppression refers to persistent epistemic exclusion that hinders one’s contribution to knowledge production. The tendency to shy away from using the term “epistemic oppression” may follow from an assumption that epistemic forms of oppression are generally reducible to social and political forms of oppression. While I agree that many exclusions that compromise one’s ability to contribute to the production of knowledge can be reducible to social and political forms of oppression, there still exists distinctly irreducible forms of epistemic oppression. In this paper, I claim that a major point of distinction between reducible and irreducible epistemic oppression is the major source of difficulty one faces in addressing each kind of oppression, i.e. epistemic power or features of epistemological systems. Distinguishing between reducible and irreducible forms of epistemic oppression can offer a better understanding of what is at stake in deploying the term and when such deployment is apt.Keywords: Epistemic OppressionEpistemic ExclusionEpistemological ResilienceEpistemic PowerEpistemological Systems Notes[1] This definition of epistemic exclusion relies heavily on Irene Omolola’s use of the term (see Adadevoh 2011).[2] My definition of epistemic agency is heavily influenced by Cynthia Townley’s definition (see Townley 2003, 109–110).[3] I use Plato’s Allegory very deliberately here. The allegorical imagery of Plato’s Allegory facilitates an acknowledgement of the three features of our epistemic landscape, that is, situatedness, interdependence and resilience, which I will use to illustrate different epistemic exclusions. It also serves the goals of this paper. I am not concerned here with establishing new forms of epistemic oppression or that epistemic oppression exists. If I held these goals, then utilizing the imagery in Plato’s Allegory would be inappropriate. Rather, my objective is to highlight the possibility of pulling apart reducible and irreducible epistemic oppression. As such, I do not use “real life” examples mainly because my focus is not to demonstrate the actual existence of epistemic oppression itself. Rather, mine is a pursuit of an adequate conceptualization of epistemic oppression. For articles that highlight the existence of epistemic oppression (see Code 1995; Collins 1989; Fricker 1998, 2007; Harding 1986; Langton 2000; Mills 1999). Hence, this analysis is an inquiry into conceptual approaches that can illuminate the existence of epistemic oppression and not an attempt to locate epistemic oppression on the ground.[4] This is not to say all organizational schemata are intentionally decided upon. To say that organizational schemata are intentionally collective is to gesture to the fact that collectives can and do come together according to shared aims, values and/or beliefs for the sake of furthering those aims, values, and/or beliefs. Organizational schemata will, then, develop both inside and outside of these goals thereby creating increasingly complex social-collective schemata.[5] There may be some pause over the focus on effectiveness in this approach to organizational change. However, epistemic affairs, as I understand them, are a normative affairs. Knowing well (internal justification) and accurately (external justification) is often the goal of epistemological investigations. I take this to be a kind of effectiveness.[6] It is important to note, again, that I am not borrowing the insight Plato draws from his Allegory. Rather I am appropriating the imagery for the sake of my attempt to conceptualize epistemic oppression. Hence, my use of the Allegory may diverge starkly from Plato’s positions.[7] Epistemic exclusion is not synonymous with epistemic oppression. Recall, I defined epistemic oppression according to persisting exclusion. Hence, establishing the existence of an epistemic exclusion is only one aspect of establishing the presence of epistemic oppression. One must also demonstrate the persistence of the exclusion.[8] Some would argue that even this kind of search would most likely prove ineffective. For example, Mariana Ortega carefully details how the search for the kinds of experiences that lead to epistemic friction can often lead to “being knowingly, lovingly ignorant,” another recalcitrant form of ignorance (Ortega 2006).[9] To be clear, though Plato would go on to postulate an “outside” of the cave, where access to things-in-themselves resides. I am in no way committed to the idea that there is an outside of the allegorical cave setting Plato creates. In fact, it may well be the case that, as many suggest, there is no outside of our social worlds, where knowledge lies. Regardless of how one resolves the question of knowledge and perspective, there is, however, an outside to one’s own perspective that is often held by other knowers. Hence, the “outside,” in the allegory I am building, points to epistemically different perspectives, that is, mobile vs. fettered persons.[10] This extension of the Allegory is heavily influenced by Nancy Tuana’s articulation of the creation of “epistemically damaged identities,” Patricia Hill Collins’ analysis of the suppression of black feminist thought and Miranda Fricker’s paradigm case of testimonial injustice (see Collins 1989; Fricker 2007; Tuana 2006).[11] I use the phrase “default credibility level” because it does not denote an automatic credibility conferral, but rather a general propensity to give positive credibility assessments.[12] For an account that develops this well, see Medina 2011. Tuana cites the lower credibility given to victims of incest as an example of the “construction of an epistemically disadvantaged identity.” She explains: “Victims of incest are often judged as not being epistemically credible because they are constructed as being suggestible, gullible, or vengeful. Their testimony is discredited; their memories are questioned. In instances such as these, it is not simply facts, events, practices, or technologies that are rendered not known, but individuals and groups who are rendered ‘not knowers.’ They are constructed as untrustworthy.” (2006, 13). In cases where entire groups suffer prejudices that compromise their ability to appear credible, for example, these groups experience epistemic exclusion insofar as their ability to participate in knowledge production is compromised. Their language skills become moot. Their ability to access shared images and metaphors for communicating their experience is lessened considerably. In other words, populations with epistemically disadvantaged identities have a reduced ability to utilize persuasively shared epistemic resources.[13] Miranda Fricker, in her book, Epistemic Injustice, calls the routine deflation of a given groups credibility, testimonial injustice. She writes, testimonial injustice “occurs when prejudice causes a hearer to give a deflated level of credibility to a speaker’s word” (Fricker 2007, 1). Fricker’s epistemic injustice is a species of epistemic oppression. Insofar as testimonial injustice involves persistent epistemic exclusion that compromises epistemic agency, it is a kind of epistemic oppression. Hence, the concept of epistemic oppression is an umbrella term for multiple ideas of how knowledge production can routinely harm some people and/or populations. Elsewhere I have explored Fricker’s concept of epistemic injustice using my understanding of epistemic oppression. (see Dotson 2012).[14] I borrow this term from Fricker (2007, 17).[15] There are many examples of this kind of epistemic exclusion (see e.g. Code 1995; Collins 2000; Fricker 2007; Williams 1991). For an extended example, see the Rigoberta Menchú controversy (Arias 2001).[16] It is important to note that “minimal” here does not denote “easy” or “adequate.” It is most likely the case, as is the case with Fricker’s testimonial injustice, the changes required to address first-order exclusions are quite extensive (For an account illustrating this, see Langton 2010). However, it is unclear that one needs to abandon the value placed on credibility in order to address the creation of epistemically disadvantaged identities via credibility deficits. I imply this conclusion in my article, “A Cautionary Tale” (2012).[17] For an extended example of the difficulty of the backlash such endeavors invoke see the Rigoberta Menchú controversy (Arias 2001).[18] The additions made to the Allegory are heavily influenced by Fricker’s paradigm case of hermeneutical injustice (Fricker 2007).[19] Fricker’s example of hermeneutical injustice concerned the events leading to the creation of the term “sexual harassment,” where experiences with sexual harassment predated the term itself to the detriment of the victims. Many deny the prevalence of this kind of exclusion. They claim that it presumes that at any given time there is but one set of epistemic resources (Mason 2011). However, even if one were to take the reality of alternative epistemologies and epistemic resources into consideration, communicating with those not fluent in those alternative epistemic resources can still foster second-order epistemic exclusion.[20] See, for example (Anzaldúa 1999; Dotson 2011; duCille 2009; Lugones and Spelman 1983).[21] These extensions are influenced by Lorraine Code’s concept of rhetorical space and my concept of contributory injustice (see Code 1995; Dotson 2012).[22] There is a budding debate concerning whether Fricker’s hermeneutical injustice, which I have identified as an example of a second order epistemic injustice, affects all involved knowers equally (see Beeby 2011; Medina 2012).[23] For a good example of similar epistemic ramifications of such clashes (see Bergin 2001).Additional informationNotes on contributorsKristie DotsonKristie Dotson is an assistant professor of Philosophy at Michigan State University. She researches in epistemology (particularly testimony and feminist epistemology), feminism (particularly women of color feminist philosophy) and critical philosophy of race. She edited with Robert Bernasconi a series of books entitled Race, hybridity, and miscegenation. Within feminist epistemology, her representative publications include: In search of Tanzania, Southern Journal of Philosophy (46: Supp, 2008), Tracking epistemic violence, tracking practices of silencing, Hypatia: A Journal of Feminist Philosophy (26:2, 2011), and A cautionary tale, Frontiers: A Journal of Women’s Studies (33:1, 2012).