Toward a universal psychological structure of human values.

We constructed a theory of the universal types of values as criteria by viewing values as cognitive representations of three universal requirements: (a) biological needs, (b) interactional requirements for interpersonal coordination, and (c) societal demands for group welfare and survival. From these requirements, we have derived and presented conceptual and operational definitions for eight motivational domains of values: enjoyment, security, social power, achievement, sehxiirection, prosocial, restrictive conformity, and maturity. In addition, we have mapped values according to the interests they serve (individualistic vs. collectivist) and the type of goal to which they refer (terminal vs. instrumental). We postulated that the structural organization of value systems reflects the degree to which giving high priority simultaneously to different values is motivationajly and practically feasible or contradictory. To test our theory, we performed smallest space analyses on ratings given by subjects from Israel (N = 455) and Germany (N = 331) of the importance of 36 Rokeach values as guiding principles in their lives. Partitioning of the obtained multidimensional space into regions revealed that people do indeed discriminate among values according to our a priori specifications of goal types, interests served, and motivational domains in both societies. Moreover, the motivational domains of values are organized dynamically in relation to one another in both societies, as predicted by the patterns of compatible or contradictory motivation and practical consequences. We have noted additional values and domains possibly needed for a universal scheme as well as potential applications of this approach for comparing the meanings, structure, and importance of values across cultures, for analyzing relations between social structure and values, and for predicting and interpreting relations of values to attitudes and behavior.