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Political economists argue that developing countries with abundant natural resources are likely to suffer from the curse, a double-barreled affliction of poor governance and irresponsible economic behavior.1 Analysts have applied this approach to civil wars, arguing that primary commodity dependency may stimulate armed rebellion.2 Abundant natural resources are a honey pot, tempting potential rebels to try their luck, especially in the world's poorest regions. With few legal economic alternatives, young males will turn to violent resource plunder for survival and enrichment. This phenomenon is especially widespread in sub-Saharan Africa, resource theorists claim, because economic conditions there are particularly grim. Indeed, the incidence of civil war was higher in sub-Saharan Africa than in other regions during the 1990s, and African war-related casualties have claimed a disproportionate share of the world's total in that decade.3 Political rebellion, in this view, has much in common with regular crime, but its incidence is lower due to greater risks and start-up costs.4 General arguments about the effects of resources on civil war rely on large-N statistical analyses, but they find support in case studies from Colombia to Afghanistan.5 Some studies suggest that globalization exacerbates the resource effect on conflict, as improved transportation and communication helps even the least sophisticated warlord sell bootleg resources on world markets. Others suggest that dwindling superpower patronage makes resource-driven wars particularly attractive for elites and mid-ranking members of developing region bureaucracies and militaries. This article tests the hypothesis that abundant natural resources stimulate war by analyzing four separate incidences of armed conflict in the Republic of Congo (CongoBrazzaville), a small nation bordering on the Democratic Republic of Congo (Congo-Kinshasa, formerly Zaire). Drawing on interviews with former militia fighters, politicians, and in-country foreign observers, it analyzes the effects of oil wealth on armed conflict.6 The resource curse theory proves valid in some respects but underspecified in others. Following an ill-fated attempt at democratization, Congo-Brazzaville endured four rounds of brutal militia fighting in 1993, 1997, 1998-99, and 2002.7 Three main militias, loosely affiliated with each of Congo's broad ethnoregional groupings,