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7 he deleterious impact of civil service systems on incentives in government organizations is frequently asserted, yet very little systematic research on this problem is available in the public administration literature.' This is surprising, since correction of this alleged harmful impact of merit systems on motivation and the administration of incentives is usually one of the major objectives of civil service reform efforts at various levels of government. Indeed, emphasis on this problem in the Carter administration's reform proposals has created such an upsurge in public discussion that the complaints should by now be quite familiar. Critics deplore the excessive constraints on the firing or disciplining of even the most grossly inadequate employee. Pay and promotion, they allege, are related to performance only weakly, if at all. For these and other reasons, it is charged that civil service systems in the United States tend to impose an excessive procedural rigidity and complexity on the administration of certain major incengives, such that the systems are detrimental to effective management, employee motivation, and productivity. In spite of the frequency of such criticisms, however, and their importance as an impetus to civil service reform, research on this issue is surprisingly sparse.2 The dearth of research may be due to some formidable difficulties in undertaking it. There are major conceptual and methodological challenges, including those encountered in any research on motivation and incentives.3 Difficulties in generalizing across the variety of personnel systems in the various governments in the United States might make any but the most massive study seem inadequate. Perhaps some persons regard the problem as quite obvious by now, and not in need of further analysis.