Transcendental Experience as a Thought Experiment

In my article I would like to discuss a topic concerning the idea of mental experience as an experiment in the transcendental philosophy. One of the main problems of the humanities is that one can see a big difference between two branches of knowledge: human sciences and exact sciences. The main difference consists in the fact that the experimental data of the exact sciences can be verified by other researchers, but mental data in the mind of one researcher in humanities cannot be repeated in the mind of another. It allows for the skeptics to say that human sciences and especially philosophy cannot be real sciences. In opposition to this, the contemporary German philosopher Lambert Wiesing asserts that in the field of transcendental philosophy we do have something similar to experience in experimental sciences. It is called the eidetic variation (eidetische Variation). Three principles of the method are of great value. They are: self-reflection, phantasy, and selfclarification. In my article I am going firstly to clarify the principles of eidetic variation in Husserl's phenomenology, and secondly to relate this to the methods found in German transcendental Idealism. I see three interpretations of the term eidetic variation: as a synonym of the transcendental reduction, as establishing the eidos of a thing and the transcendental ego itself, and as something that can be held in a phantasy. The same method is used in German idealism (by Fichte for example). The main outcome of my paper should be, that if we ac-cept an eidetic variation as a transcendental method, we can explain, or at least have an opportunity to build the abstract category and understand such abstract items as beauty as well as other general philosophical notions.