Things We Lost in the Fire: How Different Types of Contestation Affect the Robustness of International Norms

Contestation of international norms has become the new focus of IR norm research. The optimism of the 1990s that fundamental liberal norms would diffuse globally has remained unfulfilled in recent years—even human rights norms have witnessed strong contestation. Time and again, controversy has erupted regarding international norms such as the ban on torture or the Responsibility to Protect. Meanwhile, we know little about how such controversy affects the robustness of norms—whether it contributes to their weakening or to their strengthening. Existing research offers two competing hypotheses: One branch of norm research often conceptualizes contestation as a sign of norm weakening. By contrast, another branch assigns contestation a normative power of its own, which strengthens norms. It does not specify the limits of such normative power, however. In this article, we argue that contestation per se is a poor predictor of norm robustness. The type of contestation a norm faces matters. Contestation can either (1) address the dimension of application of a norm or (2) examine its validity by questioning the righteousness of the claims a norm makes. The article draws on two illustrative case studies of extensively contested norms, the Responsibility to Protect and the ban on commercial whaling. We argue that widespread contestation of the very validity of a norm is likely to lead to a loss of norm robustness. Applicatory contestation, by contrast, can—under specific circumstances—even strengthen it.