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Paraphrasing the German poet Bertolt Brecht's 1949 poem “Wahrnehmung”,1 it can be said that for Latin American regionalism, the fatigue of the summits has been left behind; it must now cope with the labors of the plains. The days when Latin American presidents socialized frequently at summit meetings are long gone. In the golden age of summitry, between 2004 and 2012, four Summits of the Americas, six Latin American summits, 29 South American summits (including the Southern Common Market—Mercosur), nine Andean summits, 18 Caribbean summits, 52 Central American summits, 18 Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America (ALBA) summits, and eight Ibero-American Summits were held, for a total of 144 summits in 9 years (Portales, 2014, p. 56). It was the time when Chilean President Sebastián Piñera (Cooperativa, 2011) complained ironically that Latin America had so many summits it looked like a mountain range. Christopher Sabatini (2012) argued in Foreign Policy that, “the Western Hemisphere has a strong claim to the title of summit capital of the world,” adding that, “if the number of summits were a measure of the quality of diplomacy, Latin America would be a utopia of harmony, cooperation, and understanding.” As the comments show, the proliferation of summits has often been ridiculed or problematized. The Secretary-General of the Ibero-American General Secretariat (SEGIB), Enrique V. Iglesias (2014, p. 7), referred to the “syndrome of cumbritis” and “summit fatigue.” Latin American presidential summits were also a subject for academic debates on their merits and their dysfunctional aspects (Jarque et al., 2009; Mace et al., 2016; Ortiz, 2013). From a positive perspective, summit diplomacy created a climate of trust and facilitated political agreements, strengthened multilateralism and promoted regional integration projects (Rojas Aravena, 2009, p. 30), and was a mechanism of crisis management (Tussie, 2016). Summit diplomacy changed long before the restrictions of the Covid-19 pandemic. Latin American presidents meet less often and in fewer forums, particularly those from South America. From 2010 to 2014, an average of 7.6 presidential summits per year were organized with the participation of South American presidents (without counting the Ibero-American summits, the European Union–Community of Latin American and Caribbean States [CELAC] summits, and the Summits of the Americas), but the number fell to 4.6 in the second half of the decade (see Table 1). The fact that presidents meet less often, and even more, the lack of meetings, are indicators of the crisis of Latin American regionalism and of one of its basic components—regional organizations. A vivid example is the Union of South American Nations (Unasur), where the “golden age of UNASUR summitry might have been the 2008–2010 period, when a string of crisis happened in rapid succession and there was enough consensus to induce leaders to take action” (Tussie, 2016, p. 83). Eleven of 18 Unasur summits between 2008 and 2014 were extraordinary summits (Dabène, 2016, pp. 43–45), related mostly to acute crises. The extraordinary summit in Bariloche in August 2009, was the only one attended by all presidents, and participation subsequently decreased (Dabène, 2016, pp. 42–45; Tussie, 2016, p. 83). The last Unasur summit took place in December 2014. There were no summits in 2015, 2016, or 2017. After Ernesto Samper's mandate as Secretary General ended in January 2017, the member countries of Unasur could not agree on a successor, so the position remained vacant. Finally, in April 2018, the governments of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Paraguay, and Peru suspended their participation in Unasur. A year later, they withdrew from the moribund organization. In the case of this regional organization, the lack of interaction between the presidents resulted first in its paralysis and later in its disintegration. Unasur is not the only organization that has been paralyzed as a result of the political polarization between the governments of the member states. Another exemplary case is the crisis in CELAC. The last presidential summit was held in January 2017, in the Dominican Republic, only 10 presidents attended (with the notable absences of the presidents of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, and Uruguay, who at least sent representatives). Then, step by step, CELAC became paralyzed. As collateral damage, it was no longer possible to hold the European Union–CELAC summit planned for October 2017, due to the conflicts within CELAC. There were no presidential summits in 2018, 2019, or 2020. The decline in presidential meetings in Latin America and the tragic fate of Unasur confirm a central feature of Latin American regionalism that is both intergovernmental and interpresidential. This combination has given impetus to regional integration, especially in times of strong presidential leadership (here the role of the pro-tempore presidencies in regional organizations is important; Morales Ruvalcaba, 2020) and political affinities among presidents (Baracaldo & Chenou, 2019). Yet, in times of polarization and lack of political consensus, these characteristics of Latin American regionalism have led to deadlocks and a lack of progress. While presidents' and governments' policies and strategic decisions are crucial to the success and survival of regional organizations, they do not act in a vacuum. The presidents make decisions in a political–economic context that, in the case of Latin American regionalism, combines specific structural constraints on integration with positive and negative incentives from the global international political economy that define (and modify) basic parameters for the implementation of regional projects. Presidential activism had been necessary to overcome some of the structural constraints of Latin American regionalism, as is discussed below. Meanwhile, the same structural limitations make it difficult for Latin American regionalism to recover, especially since the challenges have increased due to the consequences of the Covid-19 pandemic. Therefore, the road through the plain will be long and rocky. The purpose of this article is to explain why this is the case and to discuss strategies to overcome the crisis. Latin American regionalism was already in crisis before the Covid-19 pandemic broke out. Over the past decade, the region had suffered, as one author aptly put it, “a disinvestment of spaces for the coordination of multilateral policies” (Pauselli, 2020). The only organization that represented all Latin America and the Caribbean (CELAC), and the only organization that covered all South America (Unasur) were paralyzed or in a process of disintegration. As the Covid-19 pandemic spread across Latin America, most regional organizations were in bad shape. Brazil has questioned its membership in Mercosur, and there is no consensus among member governments about the future course of the organization. The Pacific Alliance has stagnated as it was downgraded in Mexican foreign policy. And ALBA has lost most of its attractiveness due to the ongoing crisis in Venezuela and changes of government in member countries. In addition, the pandemic exacerbated the preexisting structural constraints of Latin American regionalism, with the result that an Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) study (2020c, p. 21) from August 2020 concluded that “the current situation is particularly inimical to initiatives to deepen regional integration”. The Covid-19 pandemic hit a region that was already in an economic crisis. After the commodities boom ended, Latin American economies had to adjust. In the period from 2014 to 2019, the regional gross domestic product (GDP) growth rate was only 0.4% (ECLAC, 2020a, p. 8), much worse than in the so-called lost decade of the 1980s. When there were signs of a recovery, the pandemic hit Latin America in full force. A massive economic downturn was one of the consequences. According to calculations by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) (Werner et al., 2021), Latin American GDP contracted by 7.4% in 2020 (South America −7.1%). ECLAC (2020b, pp. 10–11) forecast that the number of people living in poverty would rise to 230 million, or 37% of the population, and projected greater inequality in income distribution in the region. The current crisis of Latin American regionalism has both a political and an economic dimension, making a way out of the crisis more difficult. While both dimensions interact, each one also has its own dynamic. It can be argued that as trade (and cross-border investment) increases, so does the political pressure from economic actors to deepen regional cooperation. A decline in regional economic exchange has the opposite effect. In addition, external economic actors intervene, since they can give priority to trade negotiations with regional blocs, or prefer bilateral agreements. The second dimension relates to the political and strategic incentives for cooperation. It can be assumed that it is easier for governments to work together when they have a political-ideological affinity. Closer cooperation is more difficult when governments are politically and ideologically far apart. It is possible to divide the development of Latin American regionalism since 1990 into three periods, characterized by different configurations of the political and economic environment. This exercise can help to gain a better understanding of why the current regionalism crisis is so challenging. The environment in the 1990s was conducive to regional political and economic cooperation. Center-left and center-right governments shared a common economic preference under the so-called Washington Consensus on opening their economies and promoting regional integration. Intraregional trade (as a percentage of total trade) peaked in 1994, with a share of 21.9%. In addition, Latin American countries increased their cooperation on security issues, and there was broad consensus on the consolidation of liberal democracy, which led to the promotion of democracy protection clauses in regional organizations (Heine & Weiffen, 2015). During the first decade and at the beginning of the second decade of this century, the political environment was conducive to regional cooperation, but the economic context was less favorable. During the “pink tide” of left or center-left governments, there was much political consensus (but also some competition for leadership) that gave a new boost to the processes of regional cooperation and integration. It is reflected in new regional organizations (ALBA, Unasur, CELAC) and the repositioning of existing ones economic growth and increased the for in foreign by Latin American the same the incentives for economic integration due to the commodities boom and a of the Latin American in the first decade of the that a less economic environment for regional integration can be overcome through positive political The in of economic was by a in and by the of Unasur (and later with a political than economic the of as a new to regional integration, on political consensus the promotion of regional and increased cooperation on Unasur, through its covered a of of and & Tussie, & promoting regional cooperation in these The of political regionalism was The economic and political for regional projects in Latin America became more in the second decade of this The Covid-19 pandemic exacerbated preexisting structural Latin American regionalism is characterized by economic the countries of the region have much economic than economic 1990 and 2014, trade all had a share of in In trade in Latin America and the Caribbean as a percentage of total trade not the et al., 2017, p. 2017, p. The of the in to Latin American countries has been a to greater economic on in regional & to the commodities the share of in the foreign trade of Latin American countries to According to ECLAC p. since America and the Caribbean has been a process of trade In 2019, trade for less than of total Latin American When the Covid-19 crisis hit the Latin American economies in trade fell more than The most ECLAC p. a regional trade share of the since the most trade are even The average for for the period was only Pacific Central American Common (ECLAC, p. and decreased to in the first of 2020 (ECLAC, p. It could explain why in has 2020). the presidents of Brazil and are the of making more so that each member can on its The negative economic incentives in an difficult political environment. the of the second decade, the political and polarization of in Latin America has The to in Venezuela led to an in conflicts in the especially the to governments in many Latin American there were also governments that The political-ideological polarization has not only the development of regional projects but has also the survival of existing regional organizations. the rise of a new or & especially in Brazil & the has even more The liberal had regional integration, with the of a better integration into the economy by regional with for economic The Pacific Alliance is an example of this liberal and In the multilateral and agreements. As a both the on the left and the on the the for regional cooperation. 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