Divine Activity and Motive Power in Descartes's Physics

Abstract This paper is the first of a two-part reexamination of causation in Descartes's physics. Some scholars – including Gary Hatfield and Daniel Garber – take Descartes to be a `partial' Occasionalist, who thinks that God alone is the cause of all natural motion. Contra this interpretation, I agree with literature that links Descartes to the Thomistic theory of divine concurrence. This paper surveys this literature, and argues that it has failed to provide an interpretation of Descartes's view that both distinguishes his position from that of his later, Occasionalist followers and is consistent with his broader metaphysical commitments. I provide an analysis that tries to address these problems with earlier `Concurentist' readings of Descartes. On my analysis, Occasionalism entails that created substances do not have intrinsic active causal powers. As I read him, Descartes thinks that bodies have active causal powers that are partly grounded in their intrinsic natures. But I argue – pace a recent account by Tad Schmaltz – that Descartes also thinks that God immediately causes all motion in the created world. On the picture that emerges, Descartes's position is both continuous with, and a subtle departure from, the Thomisitic theory of divine concurrence. Keywords: DescartesOccasionalismcausationlaws of physics Notes 1Gary Hatfield, 'Force (God) in Descartes' Physics', Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, 10 (1979) No. 2: 113–40, reprinted in John Cottingham (ed.), Descartes, Oxford Readings in Philosophy Series (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998) 281–310. Page references will be to the 1998 reprint. Daniel Garber, Descartes' Metaphysical Physics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992) 299–305 and 'Descartes and Occasionalism', in Causation in Early Modern Philosophy, edited by S. Nadler (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University, 1993) 9–26, especially 12–15. George Boas, Dominant Themes, A History (New York: Ronald Press, 1957) 104–5, also seems to suggest this reading. Other authors have attributed body–body Occasionalism to Descartes on grounds other than those advanced by Hatfield and Garber. See for example Jonathan Bennett, Learning from Six Philosophers (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2001) vol. 1, 99–101, and Geoffrey Gorham, 'Cartesian Causation: Continuous, Instantaneous, Overdetermined', Journal of the History of Philosophy, 42 (2004) No. 4: 389–423, especially 400–3. 2Kenneth Clatterbaugh, 'Cartesian Causality, Explanation and Divine Concurrence', History of Philosophy Quarterly, 12 (1995) No. 2: 195–207, and The Causation Debate in Modern Philosophy, 1637–1739 (New York and London: Routledge, 1999), especially 32–42, passim 52–66; Michael Della Rocca, '"If a Body Meet a Body": Descartes on Body–Body Causation', in New Essays on the Rationalists, edited by Rocco J. Gennaro and Charles Huenemann (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999) 48–81; Alan Gabbey, 'Force and Inertia in the Seventeenth Century: Descartes and Newton', in Descartes: Philosophy, Mathematics and Physics, edited by Stephen Gaukroger (Brighton and Totowa: Harvester, 1980) 230–320; Martial Guéroult, 'The Metaphysics and Physics of Force in Descartes', in Descartes: Philosophy, Mathematics and Physics, edited by Stephen Gaukroger (Brighton and Totowa: Harvester, 1980) 196–229; Helen Hattab, 'The Problem of Secondary Causation in Descartes: A Response to Des Chene', Perspectives on Science, 8 (2000) No. 2: 93–118, and 'Concurrence or Divergence? Reconciling Descartes' Physics with his Metaphysics', Journal of the History of Philosophy, 45 (2007) No. 1: 49–78; Andrew Pessin, 'Descartes Nomic Concurrentism: Finite Causation and Divine Concurrence', Journal of the History of Philosophy, 41 (2003) No. 1: 25–49. 3'A New System of Natures', in Leibniz, Philosophical Papers and Letters, translated and edited by Leroy E. Loemker, 2nd edn (Dordrecht and Boston: D. Reidel, 1976) 453–61, at 457; Leibniz, G.W. Leibniz: Die philosophischen Schriften, edited by C. J. Gerhardt (Hildesheim: Georg Olms, 1960–1) vol. IV, 483. 4Georg Bernhard Bilfinger (1693–1750) calls Malebranche's followers 'occasionalistas' in his Dilucidationes Philosophicae, edited by Jean Ecole et al. (Tübingen, 1725), reprinted in Christian Wolff: Gesammelte Werke, Materialien und Dokumente (Hildeshiem: Georg Olms, 1982) vol. 18, 351. Kant seems to have coined 'Okkasionalism' in the Critik der Urtheilskraft, §81 (1st edn Berlin and Libau: Lagarde & Friederich, 1790; 2nd edn Berlin: F. T. Lagarde, 1793), where he contrasts it with 'Prästabilism'; see Kant's gesammelte Schriften, edited by Könglich-Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin (Berlin: Georg Reimer, 1910–) vol. 5. In the Critik der reinen Vernunft (Riga: Hartknoch, 1781) 389–90, Kant had called Occasionalism the 'system of supernatural assistance'; see Kant's gesammelte Schriften, vol. 4, 422. 5Occasionalism also persisted well into the eighteenth century – most notably in Berkeley, whom Alfred Freddoso groups with Malebranche as a 'representative' example of a modern Occasionalist in 'Medieval Aristotelianism and the Case Against Secondary Causation in Nature', in Divine and Human Action, edited by Thomas V. Morris (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988) 74–118, at 76; for further discussion of Berkeleyian Occasionalism see Charles McCracken, Malebranche and British Philosophy (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1983) 211–17. 6Aquinas is referring to Islamic authors who followed the tradition of Abu al-Hasan al-Ashari (c. 873–c. 935), in particular Abu Hamid al-Ghazali (1058–1111). See Al-Ghazali, The Incoherence of the Philosophers = Tahāfut al-falāsifah: A Parallel English–Arabic Text, edited and translated by Michael E. Marmura (Provo, UT: Brigham Young, 1997) 170–81. 7 DM 18.1.1. (See end of article for abbreviations of source citations.) Suárez associates Occasionalism with Pierre d'Ailly (1350–1420) and Gabriel Biel (c. 1420–95), who were influenced by Nicholas of Autrecourt (c. 1295–1369). See Nicholas of Autrecourt, Second Letter to Bernard, in Nicholas of Autrecourt: His Correspondence with Master Giles and Bernard of Arezzo, translated by L. M. de Rijk (Leiden and New York: J. Brill, 1994) 58–75; Pierrre d'Ailly, Questiones super libros sententiarum, lib. IV q. 1 a.1 (Strasburg, 1490; facsimile edition Frankfurt: Minerva, 1968); Gabriel Biel, Epitome et collectorium ex Occamo circa quatour sententiarum libros, lib. IV dist. 1 ques. 1 art. 3 (Tübingen, 1501; facsimile edition Frankfurt: Minerva, 1965). For the connection between these authors and Malebranche see Steven Nadler, '"No Necessary Connection": The Medieval Roots of the Occasionalist Roots of Hume', Monist, 19 (1996): 448–66, at 448–9. 8One difference between how Aquinas states Occasionalism in SCG and the way Suárez and Leibniz describe it is that in SCG Aquinas states Occasionalism as a claim only about natural agents. Interestingly he does not place this restriction on Occasionalism in ST I q. 105 art. 5. This restriction is relevant to the question of how Occasionalism is consistent with free will; I will be bracketing this issue. For further discussion, see Frederick Copleston, A History of Philosophy, Volume IV, Modern Philosophy: Descartes to Leibniz (London: Burns, Oates & Washbourne, 1960; reprinted New York: Doubleday, 1994) 190–6; Tad Schmaltz, 'Human Freedom and Divine Creation', British Journal for the History of Philosophy, 2 (1994) No. 2: 3–50; David Scott, 'Malebranche on the Soul's Power', Studia Leibnitiana, 28 (1996): 37–57; and Andrew Pessin, 'Malebranche's Doctrine of Freedom/Consent and the Incompleteness of God's Volitions', British Journal for the History of Philosophy, 8 (2000): 21–53. 9Leibniz's characterization of Occasionalism has cast a long shadow on the historiography of Occasionalism. His reading of Occasionalism was repeated in Wolff, then in German historians like Bilfinger, and then in Kant. This tradition helped cement the tradition of describing Occasionalism as an intended 'solution' to the mind–body problem. See for example Robert Adamson, The Development of Modern Philosophy (Edinburgh: W. Blackwood, 1903) vol. I, 39–40; Bertrand Russell, A Critical Exposition of the Philosophy of Leibniz, 2nd edition (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1937) 140; Boas, Dominant Themes, 103–4, 106, 115–16; Copleston, Descartes to Leibniz, 176–7; and Bernard Williams, Descartes: The Project of Pure Inquiry (Atlantic Heights, NJ: Humanities Press, 1978; reissued London and New York: Routledge, 2005) 273. Page reference is to the 2005 reissue. More sympathetic expositors have argued (rightly I think) that Occasionalism was motivated by more general theoretical considerations. See for example Martial Guéroult, Malebranche (Paris: Aubier, 1955–9) vol. 2, 210–11; Ferdinand Alquié, Le Cartésianisme de Malebranche (Paris: J. Vrin, 1974) 253–4; Thomas Lennon, 'Occasionalism and the Cartesian Metaphysics of Motion', Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Supplement 1 (1974): 29–40; Louis Loeb, From Descartes to Hume (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1981) 210–28; and Steven Nadler, 'The Occasionalism of Louis de la Forge', in Causation in Early Modern Philosophy, edited by Steven Nadler (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University, 1993) 57–73. 10See Search, Elucidation XV LO 663–7, passim 678–80, where Malebranche explicitly contrasts Occasionalism with the view defended by Aquinas; see also Search VI.2.3 (LO 450), where Malebranche argues for Occasionalism by arguing against the Thomistic theory. 11 ST I q. 105 art. 5. Freddoso's 'Medieval Aristotelianism and the Case Against Secondary Causation in Nature' is a particularly helpful account of the medieval background of Occasionalism: much of what I will say below follows Freddoso's analysis. I am also indebted here to conversations with Robert Sleigh. For a more recent summary of this background see Tad Schmaltz, 'The Scholastic Context', in Descartes on Causation (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2008) 9–48. 12Later Scholastics associated this view with Durand de Saint-Pourçain (1270–1332). See for example Suárez, DM 22.1.2. 13See SCG III.65ff, and ST I, q. 8 art. 1, and q. 105 art. 5. There was broad agreement on this point among medieval and early modern authors. See for example Suárez, DM 21; Descartes, Third Meditation (AT VII 49; CSM II 33) and Principles I.21 (AT VIIIA 13; CSM I 200); Malebranche, DMR VII.vii (R XII 156–7, 160; JS 112, 115); and Leibniz, Theodicy, art. 385, translated by A. Farrer (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1951; reprinted Chicago: Open Court, 1990) 355. Page reference is to the 1990 reprint. 14 SCG III.70.8. See also DM 22.1.22. 15 DM 22.1.22. 16It follows that divine concurrence is not a kind of over-determination: God chooses to let creatures help bring about events, and created substances could not produce their effects without God's concurrence, so neither God's concurrence nor the creature's action is individually casually sufficient for the effect. See SCG III.70.6–7. 17 DMR VII.xiii (R XII 165–6; JS 120). Suárez notices this feature of Occasionalism when he says in DM 18.1.1 that for the Occasionalists 'action is attributed to fire, water, and so on … because God has resolved, as it were, to produce certain effects only in the presence of such things'. 18 Search VI.2.3 (LO 448) is a typical example of how Malebranche states Occasionalism: 'there is only one true cause because there is only one true God … [and] all natural causes are not true causes'. 24This is similar to R. Harré's definition of a causal power in 'Powers', British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 21 (1970): 81–101, at 85. While the Scholastics think that causal powers are themselves intrinsic properties, Harré thinks that they are dispositional properties that have an intrinsic basis. 19In comments on an earlier version of this paper presented at the Midwest Seminar in Early Modern Philosophy at Marquette University in November 2008, Thomas Lennon pointed out that this dispositional analysis of powers does not fit the case of volitional agency. The will is clearly an example of a 'power' for medieval and early modern authors. Yet it is false that, if placed in given circumstances, a free agent will (automatically) bring about a certain effect. I take this to be a problem with the analysis of volitional agency, and not a counterexample to describing causal powers (free or otherwise) as dispositions. That is, I think it is the task of a philosopher who (i) thinks that actions involve the exercise of a power and (ii) thinks that some actions are free, to explain how some powers are exercised only pending the free choice of the will. In what follows, I will be interested only in the actions of 'natural agents', for whom the exercise of causal powers is not dependent on or controlled by the will. In these cases I think this dispositional analysis applies unproblematically. 20The counterfactual analysis of dispositions is a matter of controversy in contemporary philosophy. For an example of the standard analysis, see J. L. Mackie, 'Dispositional Statements', in Truth, Probability and Paradox (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1973) 120–33; for objections to the standard analysis, see C. B. Martin, 'Dispositions and Conditionals', Philosophical Quarterly, 44 (1994): 1–8, and R. K. Shope, 'The Conditional Fallacy in Contemporary Philosophy', Journal of Philosophy, 75 (1975): 397–413; see also David Lewis, 'Finkish Dispositions', Philosophical Quarterly, 47 (1997): 143–58. Medieval and early modern thinkers were not concerned with these issues, and as such sometimes parse talk of powers in terms of counterfactuals – however, we should not take these instances as evidence that they thought causal powers could be exhaustively analysed in terms of such counterfactuals. 21The Scholastics distinguished between the sense in which a substance is a principle of change and the sense in which a power is a principle of change by saying that a substance is a principium quod – the principle that causes the effect – and a power is a principium quo – the principle by means of which the effect is caused. See for example Suárez, DM 17.2.7. 22'Manifestum est autem hoc principium potentiam quamdam esse: hoc enim dicimus potentiam principium intrinsecum quo agens agit, vel patiens patitur.' Thomas Aquinas, De occultis in S. edited by R. vol. This point is not in he clearly thinks that substances – that is, substances that are not – have an intrinsic principle of motion. See Physics and Metaphysics The cases of causation we are all be as natural in this Aquinas, de a.1 edited by vol. authors not themselves describe these terms as however, I think this a reading of their For an case of in contemporary see David Lewis, in Papers in Metaphysics and 1999) at As I the Scholastic tradition active causal powers as causation and causal powers in terms of these active powers. This tradition into early modern for whom 'power' to an active causal contemporary authors take causation as to active and and do not take the between active and causal powers to have much theoretical See for example Mackie, Truth, Probability and the of a version of Occasionalism that says that creatures have causal powers do not exercise and then argues that this view is I take it that Occasionalist that some not only do not also do not certain causal powers. See 'The Case Against Secondary Causation', Elucidation XV (R 28 Freddoso in 'The Case Against Secondary Causation', for whom the of Occasionalism both active and causal powers in Guéroult, et de la Descartes et de et reprinted in as 'The Metaphysics and Physics of Force in Descartes', in Descartes: Philosophy, Mathematics and Physics, edited by Gaukroger Harvester, 1980) Alan Gabbey, 'Force and Inertia in the Seventeenth Century: Descartes and Newton', in Descartes: Philosophy, Mathematics and Physics, edited by Gaukroger Harvester, 1980) 230–320; this paper is a version of 'Force and Inertia in Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, 2 Page references to both will be to the edited by VIIIA and Cottingham et al. the relevant 'power' than as in their of in CSM I Guéroult, 'The Metaphysics and Physics of where he that of or motion … are in or Alan Gabbey, 'Force and For Gabbey, is an of in the sense relevant here as the cause of a is a of when it is the of a VIIIA CSM II the relevant which CSM as is translated as in Gabbey, 'Force and VIIIA CSM II Guéroult, and Physics of Gabbey, 'Force and seems to with the claim of Scholastic that God's of concurrence and the of a cause are See for example Aquinas, ST 2, and Suárez, DM Yet the of is it other to the active principle in an to the exercise of that or to the of the Suárez that the cause and cause have the in the DM and on to argue that they do not by means of the active seems to that and take Descartes to think that God and bodies a active On this reading Descartes's view from as it was by that Suárez explicitly argues in DM that the divine of concurrence should not be thought of as certain that from the and is in the or in the of a principle and and in how they the of Guéroult, and Physics of that the that a and are and the … to the Scholastic between that the of a and that only on the to this of and that on a to bring about their and effect is to the in a to explain the in which the God to bodies is both the and the cause of see 'Force and On the between these see Tad Schmaltz, Descartes on Causation (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2008) Principles (AT VIIIA CSM I See Guéroult, and the Physics of and Gabbey, 'Force and passim and Physics of Principles (AT VIIIA CSM I especially Principles where Descartes says that all of are or of and Principles where he that all or are the of which they are to be or or are in – not if a particular is a feature of bodies – which it be for Descartes – then it in one is Clatterbaugh, account of Descartes's is in argues The Causation passim that is for Descartes. that Descartes's metaphysical theory of causation is and to account for the way that the in bodies be as they with one Yet on to argue that Descartes's about natural motion be sense of if we causes as in a than as substances like On interpretation, Descartes's view of causation in physics be sense of only by saying that Descartes between of a cause – the one a of a the other a of a of interpretation is, I influenced by the of paper 'Force (God) in Descartes' in in 1998) and from the early an earlier version of this reading in his paper 'Cartesian Causality, Explanation and Divine presented a similar view in his powers and Occasionalism from Descartes to in Descartes' Philosophy, edited by John and John (New York and London: Routledge, an earlier of which was as a paper in – the authors I – does not his reading of Descartes with the tradition of he it a of Occasionalism. Des Philosophy in and Cartesian (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, Hattab, Descartes' Physics with his Metaphysics', See also Hattab, 'The Problem of Secondary Causation in Descartes', Hattab, Descartes' Physics with his Metaphysics', Michael Della Rocca, 'Descartes on Body–Body Causation', and Andrew Pessin, Nomic Rocca, 'Descartes on Body–Body Causation', Andrew in Nomic true that matter is is not of and the it neither or other But given that in God the then matter is in Elucidation XV (R LO Elucidation (LO my Search VI.2.3 (R II LO my view that Della and is similar to the view advanced in and Occasionalism from Descartes to argues that Descartes is to body–body Occasionalism. he Occasionalism to be the claim that causes are causes that have their causal powers only as a of God's certain of DMR VII.xiii (R XII 165–6; JS 120). Search VI.2.3 (R LO See also Search (LO and Search (LO Principles (AT VIIIA CSM I VII 49; CSM II see also Principles I.21 (AT VIIIA 13; CSM I for example Thomas Aquinas, SCG III.65ff, and ST I q. 8 art. 1, and I q. 105 art. see also Suárez, DM does not that God at a particular God substances in such a way that they at a God's is the of God's some reference to is more or explicitly in the Cartesian See Louis de la de de in Louis de la edited by Pierre (Paris: de 1974) Body of Philosophy to the Principles of the de I (London: IV, and Malebranche, DMR (R XII JS Search (LO and Elucidation I (LO this that if God a at a then God that at a This is for example in Malebranche DMR Yet it also follows from alone that a does not God because without God's of the to than change of the also that if God a at position and then the is at position at This seems and I think this is point when he says that if God not a where then there be that could it to that position Schmaltz, Descartes on Causation (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, especially See also Tad Schmaltz, 'Cartesian Causation: Body–Body and the Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science, Descartes on am not that this Descartes's As I see it these one is true that God is for Descartes a of and also that God is the cause of all effects in the created world. it is true that creatures are for Descartes of But there are such as the that are of and God as a Descartes this to explain how God created substances in But he I it to to explain how the cause of motion from the causes of motion. Descartes on passim As Schmaltz him, Descartes thinks that the of motion from of motion and that in Contra Della and Pessin, Schmaltz 'Descartes does not that God the which in matter in motion. the view that I in is that God matter in and that the the of what God has I think Della and that the of motion are the of God's of however, like Schmaltz I do not think that the powers of bodies on these the of motion and the powers of bodies are on my view of one they as only of the causal of natural motion for Descartes. where Schmaltz are here Descartes' from the position in Suárez … Descartes seems to to be to the of also Gorham, 'Cartesian Causation', of the (AT VII CSM II Principles (AT VIIIA CSM I and Letter to (AT See also the Letter to 21 (AT where Descartes God's concurrence in all and to have this in the The to which he seems to (AT VII CSM II how substances of an to in is in his of Scholastic about the of the or Schmaltz in a way that with the Scholastic tradition by the Thomistic claim that God's concurrence is for creatures to Descartes does not explicitly this Thomistic there is some to think to the Principles that his of the of the Scholastic view were of these from circa and in Descartes to that he had not read Scholastic (AT and to Scholastic for to that he was reading one of these – – as he on the Descartes's of in Principles – one of these from in the – Descartes's claim about God's concurrence in the of the and be a from his of the in earlier VIIIA CSM I Descartes on argues this does not that Descartes is a because it does not to the claim that the or of a is with God's of concurrence. is not to that this claim is a of if it were, this does not that Descartes this The here seems to be or not Descartes says that God's concurrence an Schmaltz is to point out that he does not do so in this Letter to (AT IV Schmaltz this in Descartes on argues that it is consistent with the view that the will is an he does not address how Descartes's claim that God is the cause of with his that the of bodies cause of motion in such a way that they on God's concurrence only for the of the bodies in which they This I that God is only a cause of motion. in this was by a of at the University of by and I am indebted to and as I this and to and for their comments on early of this abbreviations are the = Descartes, de Descartes, edited by and edn (Paris: by and As translated in The Philosophical of Descartes, translated by J. R. D. and A. University Press, = CSM I or II for the first for vol. DM = Suárez, in edited by C. (Paris: Louis As translated by Alfred Freddoso in On Metaphysical 18 and 19 (New University Press, 1994) and On and Metaphysical Press, DMR = Malebranche, la et la in de Malebranche, edited by A. vol. 12 = (Paris: J. Vrin, by and as well as and As translated in on Metaphysics and on edited by translated by D. = University Press, SCG = Thomas Aquinas, Contra in S. vol. 2, edited by R. as translated in V. J. Contra University of Press, by and ST = Thomas Aquinas, in S. vol. 2, edited by R. as translated by the of the edition (New York: by and Search = De la de la and in de Malebranche, edited by A. (Paris: J. Vrin, by and or and in the cases of and or for by and by and of R. As translated in The Search Truth, translated by T. M. Lennon and J. = University Press,