Effects of politically controlled boards on bank loan performance: an emerging economy perspective

Purpose In this study, the authors explore the effects of politically controlled boards on bank loan performance in both state-owned commercial banks (SCBs) and private sector commercial banks (PCBs) in Bangladesh. Design/methodology/approach The data consist of 409 bank-year observations from 46 sample SCBs and PCBs of Bangladesh for the period 2008–17. The authors apply ordinary least squares pooled regression with year fixed effect for baseline econometric analyses and generalized method of moments regression for robustness tests after addressing the endogeneity issue. Findings The regression results reveal that the presence of bank “boards controlled by politically affiliated directors” (PA) have significant positive effects on non-performing loans (NPLs). Similarly, the presence of “boards controlled by politically affiliated directors without substantial ownership interests” (PAWOI) show positive association with NPLs. In contrast, the presence of “boards controlled by politically affiliated directors with substantial ownership interests” (PAOI) exhibit an inverse relationship with NPLs. These findings support ‘agency conflict’ arguments and document that both PA and PAWOI are detrimental to bank loan performance in Bangladesh, while PAOI do not have significant effect on increasing NPLs. Originality/value This study contributes to the existing bank governance literature by providing evidence from an emerging economy perspective, where politically affiliated directors (PADs) exploit their positions for personal and/or political gain at the cost of other stakeholders by taking advantage of relaxed regulatory oversights and investor protections.