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empirical tractability of the phenomenological ques)on, and indirectly criticises the markers-based approach highlighting its inadequacies in addressing the "distribution question" of consciousnessnamely, which animals are conscious. She argues for a paradigm shift that favours an inclusive presumption that all animals possess consciousness, challenging the premise of needing C-tests to dis)nguish conscious from non-conscious en))es.Acknowledging the complexity of applying C-tests to non-human en))es, Bayne et al. reference Dung and Newen (2023), who propose a species-sensi)ve, two-)er account of animal consciousness, aiming to assess not just whether animals are conscious (the distribu)on ques)on) but how their conscious experiences differ (the phenomenological ques)on). Both approaches highlight the diversity of conscious experiences in the animal kingdom and encourage ethical considera)ons regarding the treatment of other animal species.Andrews does not engage with Dung and Newen directly. Her focus is on proposing a founda)onal shi[ in how we approach the study of animal consciousness, arguing for the assump)on that all animals are conscious as a star)ng point for research. This approach contrasts with seeking specific markers or dimensions of consciousness, as Bayne et al.'s and Dung and Newen's suggested frameworks do, or Birch et al., (2020) before them, by instead ques)oning the very methodologies we use to infer consciousness in non-human animals.Bayne et al. champion the u)liza)on of precise markers, or C-tests, to demarcate conscious en))es.Their methodology, underscored by a commitment to scien)fic rigour, seeks to establish a clear boundary between conscious and non-conscious beings. This approach, while promising methodological clarity, may inadvertently overlook the intricate and varied nature of consciousness, poten)ally imposing anthropocentric limita)ons on the understanding of animal consciousness.However, Andrews's broad ethical presump)on of consciousness across all animals may risk dilu)ng the specificity required to discern the diverse manifesta)ons of consciousness across species.Each perspec)ve presents its merits-Bayne et al.'s methodological clarity, and Andrews' ethical inclusivity. But it is Dung and Newen's account that appears to provide a preferable methodological synthesis where the iden)fica)on of markers is informed by an ethical commitment to presume consciousness broadly, all whilst acknowledging diversity across species. Bayne et al. (2024) introduce the concept of C-tests, emphasising the urgent need for validated methods to determine consciousness across different systems, including humans at various developmental stages, non-human animals, AI, and more recent innova)ons like neural organoids and xenobots. Bayne et al. highlight the general consensus on consciousness in healthy, awake adult humans but acknowledge the debate on the presence of consciousness in other en))es or states, such as during human development, in sleep, under anesthesia, and in various brain-damaged condi)ons. They also point out the controversies over consciousness in nonhuman animals.The authors propose a four-dimensional space for classifying poten)al C-tests. These dimensions include the target popula)on (iden)fy which en))es the C-test is applicable to, such as humans, specific animals, or ar)ficial systems), specificity (measure the false-posi)ve rate of the C-test since a test with high specificity accurately indicates consciousness when it is present), sensi)vity (the test's ability to correctly iden)fy true posi)ves-genuinely conscious en))es), and ra)onal confidence (the degree of trust in the test's specificity and sensi)vity assessments). To validate C-tests, Bayne et al.suggest three strategies:The Redeployment Strategy: using variants of widely accepted tests for consciousness.The Theory-Based Strategy: grounding tests in consciousness theories.The Itera)ve Natural Kind Strategy: an itera)ve process of refining and valida)ng tests, trea)ng consciousness as a natural kind. This laber, indicated as the preferred strategy, posits that C-tests should be applied in a hierarchical fashion, beginning with "consensus cases" (e.g., neurotypical, adult humans) and extending to "neighbouring" and then more "alien" popula)ons.The authors recognise the moral implica)ons of consciousness assessment, especially since consciousness is o[en linked to moral status (Shepherd, 2018(Shepherd, , 2023)). They acknowledge the importance of aligning C-tests with ethical considera)ons, as consciousness may dictate how various en))es should be treated.Bayne et al. also address the challenge of applying these tests to non-human subjects, par)cularly when certain abili)es required by the test may be specific to humans, such as language or certain paberns of neural ac)vity.The significance of Bayne et al.'s work lies not only in the advancement of C-tests but also in the broader philosophical and ethical discourse on consciousness. By considering different popula)on targets and valida)ng the sensi)vity and specificity of these tests, Bayne et al.'s work directly contributes to the ongoing dialogue on animal consciousness and how to appropriately measure it. Bayne et al.'s (2024) proposal exemplifies methodological rigour through its systema)c and interdisciplinary approach. It sets forth a comprehensive framework to classify tests for C-tests, considering diverse en))es from human development to ar)ficial systems. This framework is underpinned by a precise categorisa)on based on target popula)on, specificity, sensi)vity, and ra)onal confidence, each dimension addressing dis)nct valida)on challenges. The authors expand the robustness of their approach by cri)cally assessing three valida)on strategies: redeployment, theory-based, and itera)ve NK, thus avoiding reliance on a single, poten)ally narrow methodological pathway. The authors advocate for an itera)ve NK strategy that emphasises flexibility and adaptability, allowing for the refinement of hypotheses and methods in light of new evidence. By transparently discussing the inherent limita)ons and crucial decision points of developing C-tests, the authors exhibit a conscien)ous understanding of the complexity of their research ques)on. This self-reflec)ve stance not only clarifies the methodological boundaries but also ensures that the research advances with clarity and precision.Although not directly addressing it, their paper can be understood as a response to Andrews ' (2024) view that "all animals are conscious" and challenges it by proposing a structured, methodological framework for assessing consciousness across a broad spectrum of en))es. This may sound in contrast with Andrews' posi)on, which promotes an assump)on of consciousness across all animals as a founda)onal star)ng point for research. Instead, Bayne et al.'s methodology could offer a systema)c way to test Andrews' asser)on and inves)gate the dimensions of consciousness she suggests should be the focus of research.Andrews (2024) advocates for a paradigma)c shi[ in consciousness studies: the scien)fic community should adopt the stance that all animals are conscious by default and then work to explore dimensions of consciousness, rather than labouring to mark consciousness in different species. This approach, she argues, is limited by its reliance on ini)al markers-pretheore)cal indicators like language, social responsiveness, and emo)onal expression-and its development of derived markers-indicators that emerge from scien)fic inves)ga)on.Andrews points out that as research progresses, the number of derived markers for consciousness increases, leading to a higher probability of ascribing consciousness to various species, poten)ally even those like C. elegans and Hydra, which tradi)onally might not be considered conscious.Andrews suggests that this approach creates an illusion of progress on the distribu)on ques)on of consciousness because it can only increase the confidence in an animal's consciousness, not decrease it.Ini)al markers are simply characteris)cs observed that set a baseline for the study of consciousness but are insufficient as proof. For instance, the fact that an en)ty displays pain behaviour or engages in goal-directed ac)vi)es does not conclusively demonstrate consciousness. This is par)cularly true in organisms whose physical forms or neural architectures differ significantly from humans or in the case of ar)ficial intelligence. Conversely, derived markers arise through more theore)cal means and o[en reveal aspects of consciousness not immediately evident through ini)al markers. These can encompass a range of behaviours that pass certain tests, or they can be mechanis)c, rooted in the neurophysiology or biochemistry of the en)ty in ques)on. These markers are less human-centric, recognising behaviours and structures dis)nct from those typically found in humans, as long as they fulfill similar func)onal roles. The derived marker approach accommodates the mul)ple realizability of psychological proper)es, indica)ng a move towards a more inclusive and varied recogni)on of consciousness markers.Andrews recommends that scien)sts should default to the assump)on that all animals are conscious and then inves)gate the various expressions and intensi)es of consciousness. This change in the scien)fic stance could catalyze more comprehensive and produc)ve research, facilita)ng the development of a rich and inclusive theory of consciousness built on data spanning a vast array of life forms.In essence, Andrews' argument is both pragma)c and methodological. She suggests that accep)ng the premise that all animals are conscious would eliminate biases that could hinder research and would leverage simpler organisms to gain insights into consciousness that might be obfuscated in more complex beings. Embracing this founda)onal shi[ would not only enhance the study of animal minds but could also have ethical implica)ons for their treatment, emphasising the importance of understanding the subjec)ve experiences of non-human beings. Dung and Newen (2023) propose a framework between markers and dimensions by addressing simultaneously the distribu)on ques)on (which animals are conscious) and the phenomenological ques)on (how consciousness experiences differ between animals).The framework establishes ten dimensions of consciousness with species-sensi)ve opera)onaliza)ons, which allows for a comprehensive comparison of consciousness profiles across different animal species. This approach differen)ates between strong and weak indicators of consciousness, enabling researchers to assign a mul)-faceted profile to animal species, reflec)ng their conscious experiences. Strong indicators are direct evidence of consciousness, while weak indicators require mul)ple instances or higher degrees of the behaviour to suggest conscious experience. Dung and Newen build upon previous work by Birch et al. (2020), while making four key advancements in their methodology: (1) a dis)nc)on between the distribu)on and the phenomenological ques)on; (2) a structured taxonomy with strong and weak indicators; (3) the inclusion of dimensions for cogni)ve processing strategies beyond content features of conscious experience; (4) a more extensive set of ten dimensions as opposed to the five suggested by Birch et al. (2020). The five dimensions included: perceptual richness (how fine-grained is percep)on), evalua)ve richness (how fine-grained is valence), integra)on at a )me (how temporally integrated is an experience), integra)on across )me (how con)nuous or fragmented is an experience), and selfconsciousness (how conscious of being a specific en)ty separate from the environment). Whereas, Dung and Newen add three dimensions of cogni)ve processing strategies: complex forms of reasoning (such as transi)ve inferences and causal reasoning), some forms of learning, and abstract categorisa)on of specific sensory s)muli or events. They also include two further dimensions: the experience of body and mental agency and that of body ownership. The experience of agency pertains to whether an animal perceives its ac)ons, including mental ac)ons, as self-generated and under its voluntary command, rather than as occurrences that exceed their control (such as, mind wandering).The experience of ownership determines whether an animal recognises its body parts as intrinsic to its being or merely as objects exis)ng within the external environment.They argue that these ten dimensions are core for any general inves)ga)on of animal consciousness, but they are adaptable for more specific comparisons, such as between two species or different stages of ontogene)c development.The opera)onalisa)ons for these dimensions draw from a variety of behaviours and cogni)ve abili)es.For example, perceptual categorisa)on can be measured through tests like discrimina)on learning and mo)va)onal trade-offs, whereas agency might be gauged through tasks tes)ng delay of gra)fica)on or response inhibi)on.Their work contributes to the understanding of animal consciousness by offering a structured framework that can inform both empirical research and ethical considera)ons about the treatment of animals. Their approach specifically seeks to recognise indicators of consciousness that are poten)ally unique to non-human animals, which could differ significantly from human consciousness markers. In addi)on, the introduc)on of strong and weak indicators adds a layer of complexity to the evalua)on of consciousness. This dis)nc)on acknowledges that not all indicators provide the same level of evidence for consciousness, and a set of weaker indicators can collec)vely signal the presence of consciousness in an animal. Process-oriented indicators for cogni)ve processes such as reasoning, learning, and abstrac)on reflect a deeper inquiry into how consciousness operates rather than just its outward manifesta)ons. This shows an interest in the mechanisms of consciousness, providing a richer picture than what might be obtained through more sta)c, trait-based markers. A defining feature of their framework is its adaptability and openness to revision based on empirical findings. This flexibility is an acknowledgement of the evolving nature of consciousness science. Their framework is not just theore)cal but comes with concrete opera)onalisa)ons for each dimension, providing tangible, testable manifesta)ons of consciousness. This aspect is par)cularly valuable as it moves the field beyond theore)cal specula)on to empirical inves)ga)on. Furthermore, the authors recognise the limita)ons of current methodologies and introduce what they term pragma)c idealisa)ons. This approach is intended to guide and refine research without making unwarranted asser)ons, which marks a departure from the some)mes binary perspec)ve of tradi)onal markers.Dung and Newen's perspec)ve can be seen as an intermediary between the marker-based approach of Bayne et al. and the universal consciousness claim argumented by Andrews. While they u)lise a form of markers through their structured taxonomy, their approach is species-sensi)ve and acknowledges the diversity and richness of consciousness across species.A balanced perspec)ve on animal consciousness requires both empirical and ethical sensi)vi)es. The C-tests proposed by Bayne et al.'s (2024) bring a necessary scien)fic precision to the field, while Andrews's (2024) ethical presump)on of universal consciousness ensures the moral considera)on of all animals. Dung and Newen's (2023) mul)-dimensional framework integrate these aspects, offering a methodological approach that is both scien)fically informed and ethically aware, incorpora)ng the strengths of each perspec)ve.