Replication data for: Beyond Prices: The Drivers of Farmer Loan Default

Farmers in developing countries are highly vulnerable to exogenous ecological and financial shocks; as a result, policy makers and researchers have become increasingly interested in developing policies and tools that will improve financial outcomes for smallholder farmers. One such instrument is a price-indexed indemnity loan, which forgives the farmer 50% of his loan debt if crop prices fall below a pre-specified threshold. The popularity of this type of loan is grounded in the assumption that price volatility can reduce farmer revenue, which then causes the farmer to default. However, based on data from a randomized field experiment in rural Ghana, we examine whether this assumption is valid; specifically, we empirically investigate the factors that are associated with farmer default. We find preliminary evidence that default rates are more significantly associated with changes in crop quantity, and not crop price. In addition, our analysis suggests that the social context in which loans are offered may play a significant role in whether farmers default. Although we are unable to assert causality between these various factors, we argue that such associations are compelling, and deserve further investigation in future field experiments.