Resilience Reconsidered: The Need for Modeling Resilience in Food Distribution and Trade Relations in Post Nuclear War Recovery

Abstract With a rise in global tensions among nuclear-armed states, preventative measures against nuclear war have once again attracted attention. However, recovery measures remain heavily neglected. A nuclear winter and its associated climatic effects would devastate global agriculture. Understanding vulnerabilities in post nuclear war trade networks could inform efforts to mitigate collapse risks and enable recovery. We posit that even in a limited nuclear war, key trading chokepoints and infrastructure could be targeted, severely disrupting global trade and supply chains for food, essential medicine, fossil fuels, and fertilizers, resulting in widespread famine and increasing humanity’s vulnerability to unforeseen aftershocks. The precise mechanisms and vulnerabilities in post nuclear war trade and supply chains remain poorly understood. Large fluctuations in price compounded by infrastructure destruction will impact every part of the post catastrophe aid delivery process. The trajectory of this disruption and recovery will be critical in determining the extent of the resulting famine and loss of life. We reviewed the relevant literature for the nuclear winter hypothesis, relevant famine studies, and existing complex adaptive system research on trade and supply chains. Our modeling indicates that expected deaths would peak in 250–550 detonation scenarios, therefore, the medium exchange scenarios should be a priority for future resilience research. We identify three layers of inquiry that would help future modeling work to address nuclear resilience, and recommend their inclusion by the 2025–26 UN Independent Scientific Panel on the Effects of Nuclear War. Importantly, a better understanding of reduced sunlight scenarios is applicable to several classes of catastrophe beyond nuclear exchanges.