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The purpose of the research paper is to analyze the development of propaganda structures within the Soviet state security services during Gorbachev’s perestroika, identifying key socio-political factors and KGB policy decisions that shaped these efforts. It examines changes in the structure and status of media offices at the union, republican, and regional levels and outlines the functions of the Committee for State Security’s information departments from 1985 to 1991. The scientific novelty of the article stems from its focus on the organizational evolution, functions, and status of these units during the final crisis of the Soviet totalitarian system. Conclusion. Gorbachev’s perestroika compelled Soviet state security agencies to reassess their approach to public messaging. The Kremlin’s attempt to project a more humane version of socialism drove the KGB to incorporate certain elements of glasnost and democratization, despite the institution’s inherently secretive nature. In keeping with broader political trends, the USSR KGB made deliberate efforts to present itself to the public as a legitimate, modern, and progressive institution. Regional state security bodies followed the lead of the central apparatus. As the arsenal of Chekist propaganda tools expanded, however, weaknesses in the operations of units responsible for shaping public opinion became increasingly visible – particularly the mismatch between the existing organizational and staffing models of the ‘PR’ units and the evolving demands of the time. This highlighted the need not only to revise the content and form of information dissemination but also to restructure the Committee’s media outreach system. Over the six years of perestroika, the institutional evolution in this field transitioned from being the sole ‘PR’ unit within the Soviet security apparatus – specifically, the KGB Press Bureau at the union level – to a three-tiered propaganda network spanning union, republican, and regional levels. These reforms also elevated the status of press groups. In the mid-1980s, local information-related efforts were carried out by ad hoc working groups composed of officers from various KGB departments, who performed these tasks alongside their core responsibilities. By the late 1980s and early 1990s, full-time press divisions had been formally established, though their effectiveness remained still remained constrained by systemic limitations. Gradually, the scope and effectiveness of public-facing campaigns became an important criterion for assessing the overall performance of state security units. Notably, the Committee for State Security of the Ukrainian SSR was among the territorial divisions of the USSR KGB with the highest level of engagement in ‘PR’ endeavors.