Radio Jamming Against Device Fingerprinting in Power Line Communications

Power Line Communication (PLC) systems are facing increasing security threats as adversaries leverage low-cost Software-Defined Radios (SDRs) to launch physical-layer attacks, e.g., jamming and Radio Frequency Fingerprinting (RFF), for communication disruption and unauthorized device tracking, respectively. This paper investigates the dual role of Radio Frequency (RF) wireless jamming for PLC environments, through two distinct scenarios: (i) friendly RF jamming for privacy preservation of (cabled) PLC devices against unauthorized RFF, and (ii) adversarial RF jamming to degrade the performance of legitimate RFF-based authentication systems. We conducted various systematic experiments using nine USRP X310 SDRs connected to actual PLC couplers exchanging signals modulated according to the Binary-Phase Shift Keying modulation scheme to analyze the behavior of RFF in PLC scenarios under different RF jamming levels. Our results demonstrate, for the first time, that strategic RF jamming effectively obscures device fingerprints in cabled PLC communications while maintaining communication quality, with bit error rates remaining acceptable across most configurations. We also demonstrate that device identification accuracy degrades significantly as the jamming intensity increases. Our findings establish fundamental trade-offs between privacy protection and authentication reliability, providing insights for the design of robust PLC systems.