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A leading Pauline scholar, A. Andrew Das is a professor of Religious Studies at Elmhurst University and has published prolifically on the Pauline corpus for both evangelical and broader scholarly audiences. He further introduces himself in this volume as the ‘husband of one wife’ and member of ‘a Protestant tradition that permits the remarriage of the innocent party of a divorce’ (9)—facts that are relevant to share because of the sensitive nature of the argument, which Das knows may elicit ‘bad press’ in his ecclesial context (292). Undeterred, Das sets forth a bold new examination of a long-debated matter: early Christian belief about the permissibility of remarriage following divorce. I use the singular ‘belief’ here intentionally, because Das means to demonstrate that a strong—indeed, absolute—consensus on this question can be traced from the teachings of Jesus through the Council of Nicaea (325 ce). Incongruous as it may be to modern sensibilities, Das contends that this consensus is negative: Early Christian writers are uniform in prohibiting remarriage following divorce. The study's scope is limited to this issue of remarriage, in particular. Marriage and divorce are addressed regularly, but only tangentially, as they relate specifically to remarriage. Methodologically, Das employs close textual analysis of all the most relevant biblical and patristic sources, engaging heavily with recent scholarship as he attends, especially, to grammatical and contextual considerations in each passage. Thus, his discussions are largely technical. Nevertheless, Das is well attuned to the broader implications of the study. His Introduction situates it within a stream of recent and some more popular treatments (Heth and Wenham, Instone-Brewer and Keener) whose specific readings he frequently engages (and often dismantles), even as he acknowledges that his case ‘goes against the headwinds of an emerging consensus that remarriage was permitted by the first Christians’ (12). The book therefore exhibits a refreshing combination of technical ardour and practical concern. Das's case begins (Chapter 1) with a contextual survey of ancient attitudes towards divorce and remarriage and a ‘widespread acceptance’ of both that navigates Greek, Roman and Jewish perspectives (15). In Judaism, the Mosaic Law allows for divorce certificates (Deut 24:1–4) and does not explicitly address the issue of subsequent remarriage, so that by the Second Temple period the freedom to do so is broadly assumed (the more rigid position of Qumran notwithstanding). Likewise in the Greco-Roman world, remarriage is protected as a legal right and, under Augustus, even mandated, despite the lingering conservative ideal of the univira, the lifelong, single-marriage woman. Both contexts, therefore, generally allow or even affirm remarriage, though dissent is not entirely unattested. This latter qualification is significant for Das's treatment of New Testament texts, which aims in part to address the objection that a radical rejection of remarriage within early Christianity would be ‘culturally unprecedented’ (13). Chapters 2–4 together consider the teaching of Jesus as presented in the Gospels, which, if not unprecedented, is at least deeply countercultural. Here, Das deftly navigates methodological tensions by engaging both critical and non-critical approaches. On the one hand, reconstruction of the historical Jesus ‘behind’ the Gospels yields three streams of teaching (Matt 5:32/Luke 16:18, Mark 10:11/Matt 19:9 and the Pauline material of 1 Cor 7) which meet the critical criteria of authenticity (multiple attestation, embarrassment and dissimilarity). On the other hand, the Gospels' presentations of the remembered Jesus, as analysed from the perspective of modern memory studies, include narrative contexts that frame and thus integrate his teaching on remarriage with other key themes, such as the cost of discipleship (Mark) and continuity with the law and prophets (Luke). Thus, accepting as authentic the absolute forms of Jesus's teachings against remarriage in Mark and Luke (Mark 10:11–12 and Luke 16:18) is not dependent on any particular scholarly method. What about Matthew's well-known ‘exception clauses’ (Matt 5:32; 19:9), however? Das allocates two chapters (Chapters 3–4) to these texts, the most formidable obstacles to his thesis. Much hinges on our interpretations of the phrase ‘μὴ ἐπὶ πορνείᾳ’ (the basis for the exception in both passages) and of the claim that the one who remarries commits adultery (μοιχᾶται). In Chapter 3, Das handily dismisses creative attempts to overtranslate the passive (deponent) form, such that stigmatization, rather than adultery, is in view. He also shows the grammatical untenability of both restricting and widening the meaning of πορνείᾳ in various readings. A lexical study proves that in New Testament usage, it is ‘a broad term referring to sexual relations outside [the] marital context’ (143). As traditionally understood, then, the exception clauses permit divorce on the grounds of sexual immorality, which has already severed the marriage bond. Do they also—as now widely assumed—authorize remarriage, though? Chapter 4 argues emphatically that they do not. For Das, this modern interpretation leads to some problematic conclusions (e.g., ‘the innocent spouse of an illegitimate divorce may not remarry, while the guilty spouse of a legitimate divorce would be free to do so’; 157). For both Matthean texts, Das questions the now-prevailing tendency to assume what is not explicitly stated: that the exception on the grounds of adultery applies to both divorce and remarriage. He adduces several lines of overlooked textual and contextual evidence: the variant (but possibly original) reading of Vaticanus, the phrase's grammatical positioning, comparative analysis of the construction, the constraining effect of the absolute statements in the other Gospels and the lack of early Christian references to such an exception. Moreover, he connects Matt 19:9 with the subsequent enigmatic discussion about eunuchs (19:10–12), which, on this reading, describes divorcees as those who ‘have been made eunuchs for the sake of the kingdom’. In their case, ‘As difficult as a life of such discipleship may be, Jesus insists that the celibate lifestyle remains possible thanks to the help of God’ (187). Chapter 5 turns to Paul and the earliest textual witness to the dominical tradition (1 Cor 7:10–11). Again, Das notes that any permission for remarriage must be read into the prohibition of divorce and Paul's ensuing discussion in 1 Cor 7. Das methodically counters five alternate (more flexible) interpretations, including, most notably, Paul's statement that the Christian abandoned by an unbelieving spouse is ‘not bound’ (1 Cor 7:15). Das shows that in this context, Paul uses the technical language of ‘freedom’ commonly found in divorce certificates only to describe the status of widows (7:39). The same idea is found in Romans 7:2–3, where Paul's analogy for freedom from the law assumes that a marital bond terminates only in death. With all possible escape routes exhausted, Das concludes that ‘What remains at the end of the day is the firm, unqualified, command of the Lord in 1 Cor 7:11 that the divorced are not to remarry’ (231). Finally, Das examines the reception of this dominical and Pauline material in the early Church, from the Apostolic Fathers through the canons of Nicaea. His most extensive discussions centre on Justin Martyr, Tertullian, Clement of Alexandria and Origen, though many others receive passing mentions. The findings are not surprising: One searches in vain for an explicit sanction of remarriage in cases of divorce—even in commentary on the so-called Matthean exception texts (268). Bolstering the case, Das disputes the common charge that the overly ‘ascetic’ (Platonic) tendencies of early Christianity explain this radical position. Even beyond the well-documented difficulties of defining the term ‘ascetic’, Das argues that, as his chapters on the New Testament material attest, ‘ascetic elements were present at the beginning’ of the Christian movement, in the teachings of Jesus and Paul—with the writers of the following centuries ‘merely following in their footsteps’ (275). The existential weight of his case, particularly for those who ‘draw upon the biblical witness as the sole or primary norm for personal or churchly practice’, is not lost on Das (286). If he is correct, how should his fellow Protestants, who have almost universally embraced remarriage, proceed? Das's concluding reflections are very brief, and not quite pastoral, but sensitive and hopeful. Jesus and Paul may view remarriage as adultery, but adultery, like all sins, can be forgiven. Their teachings need not imply that remarriage is a state of continuous adultery (288). Second marriages are real marriages, even if not convened appropriately, and the New Testament never calls for them to be dissolved after the fact. Das's parting counsel, therefore, is that ‘The remarried partners should repent of the adultery and then remain “where they are,” to draw on Paul's language in 1 Cor 7’ (291). Of course, Das recognizes that it is for others—ethicists, pastors and counsellors—to work out the practical implications of his argument in full; but there is no question that it will be necessary for them to do so moving forward. Though this study is scholarly and at times technical, its lucid central arguments should be accessible to determined non-specialists. And the gravity of its claims must at least be sensed and addressed, even if not ultimately accepted, by all Christians who regard Scripture and Tradition as in any sense authoritative for faith and practice.