Lottocratic Democracy and the Political Executive

ABSTRACT Lottocratic democrats advocate for replacing elected legislatures with legislatures composed of randomly selected citizens on the basis that elections are comparatively less democratic. However, the role of the executive in a lottocratic democracy remains under‐explored. This article addresses the worry that randomly selected citizens lack the specialized knowledge required to manage complex executive functions. To show that such concerns are unwarranted, I demonstrate how a lottocratic executive could be constructed which in its competence‐sensitive aspects hardly differs from existing executives in parliamentary electoral democracies. By comparing this model to current practices in Canada and the United Kingdom, where non‐expert ministers successfully oversee expert bureaucracies, I demonstrate that a lottocratic executive is practically feasible. As a result, if lottocratic democracy is democratically superior to electoral democracy, then lottocratic legislatures ought to be accompanied by lottocratic executives. This executive model would ensure genuine democratic accountability without sacrificing the epistemic advantages of professional administration.