The case for value as a common currency in decision-making and intersystem competition

Inspired by economic theory, theorists in neuroeconomics and related areas of cognitive science contend that value serves as a common currency for selection among options. Although support for the view has grown over three decades, critics have recently raised serious concerns. They argue that there are a number of pathways to action that bypass value; dissimilar psychological systems do not share a common value currency; and the view cannot accommodate well documented kinds of “irrationality,” such as context effects. This article offers a systematic response. Key refinements are made to the common currency view, distinguishing common currencies that operate at two phases (decision-phase and learning-phase) and at two levels (options-level and meta-level). A further distinction is made between mechanistic common currency models utilized in cognitive science and axiomatic common currency models associated with expected utility theory and utilized in economics. These refinements help address the criticisms and yield a more nuanced understanding of the role of value in human decision-making.