Economic Policy and Institutional Status of the Central Bank

The article is devoted to the problem of the relation between economic policy and the institutional status of the central bank. The author argues that historically the central bank’s relationship with the government has tended to be based on its operational independence, while at the end of the last century there was a global shift towards the establishment of independent central banks. This transition occurred during the period of implementation of the neoliberal project of institutional transformation to the world economy, associated with the use of neocolonial management methods by developed countries. The theoretical justifi cation for the need to implement economic policies using the independent status of the central bank and infl ation targeting is based on unrealistic neoclassical assumptions. The author proves that the independence of central banks does not allow for the necessary coordination of monetary and fi nancial policies; as a result, there is an increase in fi nancial, social and environmental threats. In this regard, it is noted that in the context of fragmentation of the world economy, the need to develop a sovereign economic policy based on a revision of the status of independence of central banks is becoming more urgent. Based on post-Keynesian ideas, the author proposes to abandon the use of the model of an independent central bank and infl ation targeting in Russia and to form qualitatively new patterns of interaction between the government and the central bank based on its accountability and a rational degree of operational independence.