Rethinking Moral Judgment: after Dual-Process theory

The Dual Process Hypothesis of Moral Judgment (DPHMJ) posits that some moral judgments (deontological moral judgments) are fast and emotion-based, while others (utilitarian moral judgments) are slow, as a result of deliberate reasoning processes. This hypothesis contraposes reason and emotion as the building blocks of our moral judgment. In her books Braintrust (2011) and Conscience (2020), Patricia Churchland addressed the issue of the neural bases of morality and vindicated the Aristotelian view of virtue ethics against the rule-based view of moral judgment assumed by the DPHMJ. In this paper, we discuss recent evidence obtained in experimental work with moral dilemmas that points in the same direction. Multiple factors influence moral judgments, such as (i) arousal properties of the situation (triggered by who is involved, where it is happening, etc), (ii) the motivational direction of the emotions triggered by the situation (eg withdrawal vs approach), (iii) the associated cognitive appraisal mechanisms (potentially influenced by enculturation and education), and (iv) biological variables such as homeostatic and biochemical states of the body, which are also motivators of behavior. The view of moral judgment that emerges is not one that contraposes reason and emotion, but one in which it is conflict that triggers moral reasoning. In so doing, we follow the naturalistic, neuroscientific, path Patricia Churchland so intensely opened for philosophy by demonstrating its relevance and value.