Executive shareholding, R&D intensity and corporate innovation: Evidence from China listed companies

Managerial ownership is widely used in corporate governance as an equity-based mechanism to mitigate principal–agent conflicts. Using a sample of Chinese A-share listed firms from 2012 to 2021, this study examines the relationship between managerial ownership and corporate innovation, and further explores the underlying mechanism, moderating effect, and heterogeneity associated with state ownership. The results show that managerial ownership significantly inhibits corporate innovation. This negative effect is partially mediated by R&D investment intensity, as managerial ownership reduces R&D spending, which in turn weakens innovation performance. Moreover, market performance pressure, particularly stock price pressure, significantly amplifies the negative effect of managerial ownership on innovation. The inhibitory effect is also more pronounced in state-owned enterprises than in non-state-owned firms. Based on these findings, we suggest that firms further refine the design and implementation of equity incentive schemes. Policymakers and regulatory authorities should also strengthen post-implementation evaluation and field-based assessment to improve the effectiveness of corporate governance policies.