Truck manufacturers in Europe: collusive businesses and markets, and an approach to estimating economic impact

Objective and interest of the work: This research proposes a replicable methodology to quantify the economic impact of cartels, focusing on the European truck manufacturers’ cartel (1997–2011), one of the largest in scope and financial penalties in EU history (€3.8B). The case involves six major medium and heavy truck manufacturers in the European Economic Area, whose coordinated actions caused severe market distortions and significant harm to road freight transport companies. Methodology: Due to the lack of reliable public data on actual truck prices, the study introduces an innovative approach: annual depreciation allowances (ada) as a proxy for medium and heavy truck prices. Data from 30,000 Spanish transport firms (1992–2015) were analysed via fixed-effects regression models accounting for revenue quartiles, macroeconomic indicators and the period during which the cartel was active. Results: The cartel resulted in an average price overcharge of 18%. The effect was disproportionately higher for smaller companies. Those operating one or two trucks experienced overcharges of up to 27%. These findings highlight the role of firm size and bargaining power in determining the extent of damage caused by collusion. Limitations: The study is limited to the Spanish market and does not rely on direct price observations. Nonetheless, ada offers a robust alternative given the data constraints. Practical implications: This methodological proposal offers policymakers and competition authorities a scalable tool to estimate economic harm in cartelised markets. It provides insight into the distributional effects of anticompetitive practices, especially on smaller firms, and supports proportional sanctioning based on firm-level impact.