The Chinese model of anti-corruption and the global anti-money laundering regime: asymmetric integration or a regulatory alternative?

The article provides a theoretical and comparative analysis of the anti-corruption model of the People’s Republic of China (hereinafter referred to as the PRC) in the context of the global anti- corruption regime and the anti-money laundering regime (hereinafter referred to as AML), institutionally formed on the basis of the UN Convention against Corruption (hereinafter referred to as UNCAC) and FATF international standards. The conceptual basis of the study is a critical reflection on the liberal presumption of the global anti-corruption regime, according to which the effectiveness of combating corruption is determined by the institutional independence of law enforcement agencies, the rule of law, transparency, and accountability of public authorities. It is argued that the practical experience of the PRC calls into question the universality of this premise. Based on an analysis of the evolution of Chinese anti-corruption policy from the early 2000s to the 2019 FATF assessment period, the transformation of the model from a politically centralized, predominantly repressive mechanism for ensuring party discipline to a financially oriented system integrated into the global AML architecture is traced. Particular attention is paid to indicators of criminal prosecution, confiscation, and repatriation of assets as indicators of effectiveness. It has been established that a high level of operational effectiveness is not accompanied by the full implementation of a liberal-institutional model and does not transform the global regime, but functions within its boundaries through selective integration. Attention is also drawn to the high level of integration of the PRC into the global anti-corruption and AML architecture. This is manifested in its participation in key international formats – UNCAC, the FATF network (through APG), the G20 Anti-Corruption Working Group, regional initiatives of the Asian Development Bank and the OECD for the Asia-Pacific region, as well as in a ramified system of bilateral treaties on extradition and mutual legal assistance. The ratification of UNCAC in 2006 and the completion of international monitoring procedures confirmed the formal compliance of the Chinese model with the basic standards of the global anti-corruption regime. At the same time, China’s international anti-corruption policy is marked by regulatory contradictions: alongside active participation in multilateral cooperation mechanisms, there remains limited willingness to fully criminalize bribery of foreign officials and to use anti-corruption tools in the context of domestic political stabilization. It has been proven that the Chinese model functions within the existing international regime, selectively implementing its standards without dismantling the centralized political architecture. This gives grounds to interpret the global anti-corruption regime not as a mechanism of normative unification, but as a multi-level structure that allows for asymmetric integration and functional equivalence of different institutional forms. In comparative terms, the Chinese experience is considered as a separate type of institutional configuration within the global anti-corruption and AML systems. It is concluded that financial efficiency is not automatically derived from a liberal institutional model, but long-term stability and international trust depend on a combination of effectiveness and guarantees of legal legitimacy.