Search for a command to run...
This paper argues that a corporatist framework underlies Schelling’s metaphysical account in the Freedom Essay (1809). Through an analysis of Schelling’s pervasive use of bodily imagery – organs, disease, fever – I examine how this framework shapes his conception of individuality, freedom, and evil. The standard interpretation sees the Freedom Essay as marking Schelling’s break with systematic idealism through its emphasis on contingency, worldly autonomy, and radical human freedom. Arguing against this reading, I contend that the corporatist framework points in a different direction. The world appears in Schelling’s account as a corporate whole, where all individuals serve their instrumental role as organs. The paper first examines Schelling’s concept of the Ground and nature, showing how what appears as contingent, blind striving is actually teleologically organized in service of a rational order. Subsequently analysing human freedom, Schelling’s portrayal of evil as disease reveals how the corporatist logic eliminates the possibility of genuine autonomy from the divine order. It makes evil’s actualization impossible by design and guarantees the final incorporation of all beings into a unified body. Through the guiding metaphor of the bodily organ, Schelling presents a vision of human personhood that sees its fulfilment in personal self-effacement. The paper argues that his corporatist logic brings the person into an impossible position: it must either efface itself willingly or be forcibly eliminated as a sick organ.