Evolutionary game analysis on the environmental synergy governance between environmental NGOs and enterprises based on quasi-birth-death process

Environmental synergy governance behaviors between environmental NGOs and enterprises are key factors to promote the efficiency of environmental pollution controlling. In this paper, it is the first to construct the game model between NGOs and enterprises in environmental pollution controlling and applies the Quasi-birth-death process to set the strategy transformation rule. Then the Gauss Elimination Method is adopted to achieve the final equilibrium distribution of the game under different exogenous environmental tax rates and different funding intensity. Finally, the influence of mutation factor and learning capability factor on the stability of the equilibrium state of the game is explored. The results show that enterprise's strategy selection is significantly affected by environmental tax rate, and it exhibits an obvious threshold effect; the heterogeneous threshold effects emerge under different participation extent discrepancy of NGOs and different governance intensity discrepancy of enterprises; Systematic mutation factor and learning capability factor will significantly affect the evolutionary synergy state. Based on the analysis, some suggestions to improve the formation of environmental synergy governance are provided.