The Chain of Custody of the Vote: A Framework for Outcome-Detectable Elections

Public confidence in election results depends on the ability to demonstrate, with evidence, that reported outcomes reflect the votes cast. This paper proposes a unified framework for the chain of custody of the vote applicable to all types of elections: manual, electronic, and hybrid. Its central contribution is the property of outcome detectability: no change to the reported electoral outcome should be possible without leaving detectable evidence somewhere in the chain of custody, making silent or undetectable outcome-changing manipulation practically impossible. Building on software independence, evidence-based elections, and risk-limiting audits, and integrating international standards on election observation and integrity, we develop a phase-based model of the electoral process, covering casting, counting, transmission, tabulation, and publication, with associated threats and required evidences at each stage. The framework is technology-agnostic and provides a common conceptual criterion against which electoral designs, procedures, and audit mechanisms can be assessed, regardless of the technology employed.