Philosophy Is What We Come to Be for

Abstract Iamblichus’ Protrepticus 9 transmits Aristotle’s telos argument—an argument similar to ergon arguments, since it investigates the nature of happiness by asking about the human end, understood as the human ergon performed well. The chapter provides a detailed analysis of the argument, which claims that the human end is wisdom because it is the last good thing that develops in human beings. The chapter also examines how the Protrepticus’ telos and ergon arguments respond to three common challenges facing such arguments: why human beings should have an ergon or end at all, whether anything can serve as a criterion for determining the ergon or end, and whether such arguments support a monistic or inclusive view of happiness. The answers Aristotle offers in the Protrepticus complete our picture of Aristotle’s position on these issues. In particular, we see that he draws on an argument also found in Physics II.8 to defend teleology in nature, struggles to identify a reliable criterion for determining ends and erga, and rejects the most common inclusive view of happiness. In the Protrepticus, all other goods are seen as valuable only insofar as they serve the highest non-composite end: wisdom.