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Biodiversity underpins ecosystem services essential to human well-being and economic stability (IPBES, 2019). Addressing environmental degradation may require 10–25% of global gross domestic product (GDP), whereas continued biodiversity loss could impose even greater economic costs within a decade (IPBES, 2024). More than half of global GDP depends on ecosystem services (UNEP et al., 2022). These services, often invisible in markets, represent underpriced or excluded natural capital (IPBES, 2019). Their degradation causes long-term, irreversible losses that are rarely captured and misalignments between private interests and collective welfare, justifying biodiversity finance integration in investment systems (Deutz et al., 2020). Since 1970, monitored wildlife populations have declined by 69% (WWF, 2022). Current extinction rates are 100–1000 times higher than natural rates (Ceballos et al., 2015). Pollinator collapse, which threatens 75% of global food crops (IPBES, 2016), and tropical deforestation reveal accelerating feedback loops between ecological degradation and human livelihoods (Miao & Nduneseokwu, 2025; Skidmore et al., 2021). Coral reefs generate an estimated USD 36 billion annually in tourism, and their decline imposes economic losses and threatens food security on coastal and small-island economies (Spalding et al., 2017). Emerging threats (ocean acidification, microplastics, and zoonotic diseases) show how biodiversity loss amplifies global risks (Garland & Curry, 2022). Soil biodiversity decline undermines nutrient cycling and food production but is excluded from risk assessments. The interconnection of risks requires financial instruments in which biodiversity is integral to economic resilience (Karolyi & Tobin-de la Puente, 2023). Over USD 44 trillion in global GDP depends on nature (UNEP et al., 2022). Biodiversity loss costs USD 2.7 trillion annually through reduced agricultural yields, increased natural disasters, and declining fish stocks. Beyond preventing losses, investing in biodiversity yields cobenefits, including job creation, risk reduction, and green technology innovations. Mangrove restoration programs, for example, reduce storm damage and support fisheries and carbon sequestration (UNEP & IUCN, 2021). The above examples suggest that biodiversity finance should be viewed not purely as a conservation cost but as an adaptive investment strategy that enhances social and economic stability (Seidl et al., 2024). By quantifying cobenefits and incorporating them in project valuation frameworks, governments and financial institutions can link biodiversity restoration directly to long-term growth and risk management. Despite growing evidence of biodiversity's economic importance and investment returns, financial flows to biodiversity remain inadequate, primarily because its value is assessed within prevailing economic and financial decision-making frameworks. For example, routine application of uniform discount rates to fundamentally different forms of capital creates a distortion. Conventional financial discounting, designed for reproducible built capital, systematically undervalues long-lived and irreversible natural capital losses. Ecological-economic researchers advance a pluralistic discounting framework, arguing that different capital contributions—natural, social, human, and built—require distinct discount rates and valuation approaches (Costanza et al., 2021). Applying one market-based discount rate to biodiversity therefore embeds a structural bias toward short-term returns, reinforcing chronic underinvestment in ecosystem resilience and intergenerational welfare. The Kunming–Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework (KMGBF) global targets include protecting 30% of land and ocean areas, restoring degraded ecosystems, and reducing pollution and invasive species (Stephens, 2023). Success requires mobilizing USD 722–967 billion annually by 2030; current biodiversity spending is USD 125–143 billion. This gap reflects institutional and political barriers that prevent resource alignment rather than insufficient global wealth (Buckley, 2025; Deutz et al., 2020; Gonon et al., 2024). Closing this gap requires integrating biodiversity into national accounting systems, fiscal incentives, and corporate reporting. Aligning biodiversity finance with financial regulations, disclosure standards, and trade policies is essential to move beyond voluntary commitments toward sustained, enforceable mechanisms. The KMGBF thus represents an environmental milestone and a test of whether global financial systems can internalize ecological risk at scale (TNFD, 2023). Integrating biodiversity into national accounting systems is critical for correcting systemic underinvestment. Excluding natural capital from national accounts systematically biases macroeconomic indicators and fiscal decision-making (Costanza et al., 1997, 2017). Experimental frameworks, such as the UN's System of Environmental-Economic Accounting, reflect growing consensus that biodiversity loss represents depreciation of productive assets rather than external shocks. Embedding ecosystem services into national balance sheets would operationalize COP15 commitments by aligning fiscal policy, investment appraisal, and long-term welfare metrics. Public funding for biodiversity remains insufficient and of lower priority than infrastructure, defense, and health. Only USD 8.2 billion of international biodiversity finance has been dedicated to the 2025 target of USD 20 billion (Campaign for Nature et al., 2024). Private investment remains limited because biodiversity is still seen as a public good with uncertain financial returns. Unlike carbon markets, biodiversity lacks established pricing mechanisms, making it less attractive to institutional investors (Seidl et al., 2024). Three political-economy barriers drive chronic underinvestment: regulation-exposed industries (agriculture, mining, infrastructure) mobilize against biodiversity rules (e.g., the debate over the EU Nature Restoration Law); limited administrative capacity in developing economies slows enforcement and absorption of funds; and fiduciary norms prioritizing short-term profits discourage institutional investors from financing long-term biodiversity outcomes despite improving disclosure frameworks (European Union, 2024; Grabbe & Moffat, 2024). Thus, capital availability and a lack of institutions capable of translating commitments into bankable projects and enforceable incentives are core constraints. Where credible rules, clear performance benchmarks, and risk-sharing mechanisms exist (e.g., under the EU Taxonomy and Costa Rica's payment for ecosystem services [PES] scheme), capital deployment accelerates (European Commission, 2024; MINAE, 2023). Addressing biodiversity financing therefore requires governance reliability, policy stability, and innovative instruments. Nearly one-third of global conservation funding targets species, yet biodiversity spending remains disproportionately concentrated in wealthier regions (Guénard et al., 2025). For example, Sub-Saharan Africa, Southeast Asia, and Latin America allocate less than half the funding allocated to Europe and North America (Ruiz-Campillo, 2024). These biases arise from data asymmetries, donor preferences for charismatic species, and risk-adjusted investment logic that rewards good governance and proven monitoring capacity, even when ecological urgency lies elsewhere. Correcting this requires embedding equity and vulnerability criteria into allocation mechanisms, a shift reflected in the Global Environmental Facility's (GEF) system for transparent allocation of resources (GEF, 2022). Empowering trusted local intermediaries (e.g., Indigenous funds and community conservation trusts) expands absorptive capacity and improves monitoring efficiency (MINAE, 2023; Romero & Putz, 2023). Directing finance toward ecological priorities succeeds when institutional strengthening accompanies capital flows, illustrating that closing bias gaps is as much about implementation capacity and governance alignment as resource mobilization. Voluntary initiatives dominate biodiversity finance (e.g., Cali Fund and philanthropy), but they generate unpredictable and unstable funding. High transaction costs and complex applications further disadvantage developing economies (CBD, 2025). Voluntary approaches can catalyze early action but are fragile. For example, voluntary carbon markets face concerns over additionality and verification. Biodiversity finance must therefore combine voluntary and mandatory models that maintain flexibility while strengthening accountability (Ruiz-Campillo, 2024; UNEP & IUCN, 2021). An early example is the Taskforce on Nature-Related Financial Disclosures, which demonstrates how voluntary frameworks can institutionalize norms and gradually transition to regulated standards without imposing abrupt mandates (TNFD, 2023). Strengthening auditing; integrating biodiversity metrics into environmental, social, and governance evaluations; and linking disclosure to supervisory requirements would reinforce durability. Implementation pathways that phase in obligations and build verification infrastructure reflect that stable biodiversity finance depends on credible regulatory signals and monitoring systems, not voluntary intent alone. Over USD 500 billion in annual subsidies support activities that degrade biodiversity (Deutz et al., 2020). Their reform is politically difficult due to employment dependence and entrenched interests. However, successful pathways demonstrate that gradual sequencing, transparency, and compensation measures can build reform coalitions. Indonesia's gradual fuel subsidy reform redirected savings to renewable energy and rural electrification (IMF, 2023). The EU's Common Agricultural Policy partially ties farm subsidies to ecoschemes that reward biodiversity-positive practices (European Union, 2024). Developing public registries of harmful subsidies and embedding reporting in global frameworks, such as CBD, could strengthen domestic accountability (CBD, 2025; UNEP et al., 2022). Subsidy realignment succeeds when paired with income diversification and rural development programs (ADB, 2023; IMF, 2023). As with other financing pathways, durable change hinges on aligning policy incentives and institutional capacity, not merely reallocating funds on paper. Mandatory biodiversity contributions are most effective when introduced gradually and aligned with economic and political realities. Starting with high-impact sectors, such as mining, agriculture, and forestry, leverages existing reporting systems and environmental footprint metrics (Nedopil, 2022; TNFD, 2023). Phased rollouts, differentiated fee structures tied to ecological impact and company size, and targeted support for SMEs help maintain competitiveness and build policy legitimacy (European Commission, 2024). The United Kingdom's Biodiversity Net Gain regulation and France's Corporate Sustainability Reporting Directive show that sequencing and transparency are critical for investor confidence and social acceptance (DEFRA, 2024). Embedding biodiversity fees in existing licensing systems reduces administrative burden, whereas clear metrics and reporting ensure funds are viewed as investments in ecosystem resilience rather than taxation (Deutz et al., 2020). These features show that the gradual implementation, credible monitoring, and visible cobenefits increase political viability and environmental effectiveness. In early stages of a project, blending public, philanthropic, and private financing spreads risk and builds confidence. Public guarantees, concessional capital, and outcome-based payments attract institutional investors while advancing social objectives. Projects can reach market scale when backed by accountable metrics and state participation (ADB, 2023; MINAE, 2023) (e.g., Latin America's Landscapes for Life and the Asian Development Bank's Green Bond Framework). Bolivia's Darwin Initiative (2025), a public–philanthropic–private partnership advancing Indigenous forest governance and community incomes, shows how targeted risk-sharing unlocks private investment in biodiverse but capital-constrained regions. The GEF's nongrant instruments and the Global Fund for Coral Reefs combine concessional public capital, guarantees, and private investment to reduce risk at scale for biodiversity projects. These initiatives demonstrate that blended finance succeeds when governance structures, outcome metrics, and public risk-sharing are clearly specified from inception (Deutz et al., 2020; GEF, 2022). Yet, credibility hinges on standardized monitoring and additionality frameworks, including those emerging through the Taskforce on Nature-related Financial Disclosures (TNFD, 2023). The success of blended-finance systems illustrates that scalable models require strong institutions, transparency, and clear cobenefits that enhance development and ecological outcomes. Reforming harmful subsidies remains politically sensitive but offers the largest potential financing gain. For example, New Zealand's fisheries-quota reform couples subsidy phaseouts with community support (IMF, 2023; MFAT, 2024; OECD, 2011). The EU's ecoscheme-linked agricultural payments show that transparency, sequencing, and accountability can drive sustainable finance (European Union, 2024; UNEP et al., 2022). Public registries of harmful subsidies would enhance benchmarking and political accountability. Across successful cases, gradual implementation, compensation of affected groups, credible monitoring, and transparent reinvestment of savings together build durable political coalitions and mitigate distributional opposition. Ensuring equitable access is essential for turning global finance into real conservation outcomes, particularly in undeveloped areas. Simplified application systems, decentralized governance, and technical support lower barriers to participation (ADB, 2023; GEF, 2022). Costa Rica's PES system and Community Trust models in Kenya and Nepal show that direct-to-community financing can improve transparency, efficiency, and trust while delivering measurable conservation gains (MINAE, 2023). Long-term success requires investment in local capacity, financial management, monitoring, reporting, and land-tenure security so communities can engage effectively and sustain outcomes. Equity is not only a moral imperative but a prerequisite for sustained legitimacy and political durability in biodiversity finance. Nature-based solutions enable biodiversity finance to scale by aligning with established climate-finance mechanisms. Harmonizing biodiversity metrics with carbon-accounting standards broadens access to climate funds and impact-investment capital (Yang et al., 2023). Growing demand for high-integrity cobenefit carbon credits presents a natural entry point, with Colombia and Gabon issuing biodiversity-linked credits under dual standards (CNC, 2024; Sequeira et al., 2024; UNEP & IUCN, 2021). Methodological clarity and robust verification standards remain essential to avoid greenwashing and sustain investor trust (MADS, 2023; Romero & Putz, 2023). Global cooperation on accounting rules and double-counting prevention will determine market integrity and scalability. As seen in other reform areas, credibility, gradual standard development, and alignment with public-benefit objectives are central to durable policy and financial outcomes. Delivering KMGBF requires finance systems that are credible, equitable, and grounded in real political economy constraints. Phased corporate contributions, blended finance, and targeted subsidy reform offer practical pathways when paired with transparency, accountability, and strengthened implementation capacity. Treating biodiversity as economic infrastructure, rather than a discretionary environmental cost, is essential to mobilize private capital and sustain political support. Moving forward, policy priorities include standardizing biodiversity-impact metrics, clarifying fiduciary rules to enable nature-related risk integration, investing in public–private monitoring capacity, and rigorously evaluating policy performance and equity outcomes. Embedding biodiversity into macroeconomic governance and financial regulation provides the most durable foundation for closing the finance gap and securing nature as a pillar of long-term human well-being. The authors sincerely thank Ning Liu from the Department of Nature and Ecology Conservation, Ministry of Ecology and Environment of China, Yan Liu from the Nanjing Institute of Environmental Sciences, and Jian Liu from Tongji University for their valuable insights and support. We also thank Professors Zhengwang Zhang, Yanyun Zhang, Lu Dong, Jianping Ge, Wenhong Deng and Yi Hu (Beijing Normal University) for their constructive suggestions and continuous encouragement throughout this research.