On the Attitude of the Youth of Primorsky Krai toward Key Anti-Crisis Strategies of the State

This article presents the results of a qualitative study conducted among the youth of Primorsky Krai in the spring and summer of 2024. Transcripts of focused interviews with 50 young men and women aged 18–25 were processed using content analysis. To increase the validity of the conclusions, data from mass surveys of youth from recent years were also utilized. Young people’s attitudes toward the main anti-crisis strategies of the Russian state in the spheres of demographic policy, education, and national security were studied using the examples of: 1) the maternity capital program and preferential mortgage programs for young families; 2) the introduction of traditional spiritual and moral values into school and university education; and 3) the Special Military Operation (SMO) and partial mobilization. It was found that the youth of Primorsky Krai have fairly general ideas about the maternity capital and preferential mortgage programs for young families, which were assessed rather positively but were also deemed insufficiently effective. Interview participants were mostly critical of the activities of state authorities in the area of family support and birth rate stimulation. In their responses, they expressed dissatisfaction with the economic situation and living conditions in the country, which demotivate Russians from having children. Young people’s attitudes toward the introduction of traditional spiritual and moral values into the educational process are generally ambiguous. Noteworthy is the fact that those supporting this vector of domestic policy (23 people) were less verbose in justifying their position than those who “support it, but with reservations,” or are negatively disposed. The latter were generous with arguments in defending their opinions. The perception of the SMO among young people is ambivalent. The vast majority of interview participants recognized it as an important event that affected them to some extent, but less than a third of respondents unequivocally voiced support for the special operation. For some informants, the SMO either was not considered significant from the start or became “routine” over time; one in four negatively assessed Russia’s actions regarding Ukraine. The attitude toward partial mobilization among young people is generally rather negative: 22 people assessed it negatively, while only 3 unequivocally supported it. During the interviews, the phenomenon of the “spiral of silence” was recorded: a significant number of informants (from one-third to one-half) refused to answer questions about the SMO and mobilization. The obtained results are planned to be used in preparing the second stage of the research, particularly as a basis for formulating hypotheses and closing alternative questions in the survey instrument.