CONSTITUCIONALISMO PREVIDENCIÁRIO E DEFERÊNCIA JUDICIAL: A ARQUITETURA INSTITUCIONAL DA REVISÃO DISTRIBUTIVA NO BRASIL E NOS ESTADOS UNIDOS

The growing judicialization of pension policies has intensified debates over the role of courts in reviewing distributive choices traditionally assigned to democratically elected branches (Tate; Vallinder, 1995; Hirschl, 2004). In contemporary constitutional systems, judicial decisions affecting pension regimes generate significant fiscal, institutional, and intergenerational impacts, challenging the boundaries of separation of powers and democratic governance (Holmes; Sunstein, 1999; Vermeule, 2006). This article argues that judicial deference operates as a central structural variable in pension constitutionalism. Through a theoretical-comparative analysis of Brazil and the United States, it proposes a Deference Gradient Model, according to which judicial review of distributive policies is not organized around a binary opposition between activism and restraint, but along a continuum shaped by institutional architecture (Tushnet, 2008; Gardbaum, 2013). The analysis examines constitutional density of social rights, procedural accessibility, administrative filtering, and interpretive methodology, demonstrating how these factors modulate the intensity of judicial intervention in pension design. The article concludes that the legitimacy of distributive review depends on institutional calibration of deference capable of reconciling rights protection, fiscal sustainability, and democratic accountability.